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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 78-2-2(3)0) and 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Issue: Did the trial court err when it granted Appellees' motion for summary 
judgment on Appellant's claims, ruling that the Combined Agreement is unambiguous and 
that Appellant does not have an interest in the same that is separate and distinct from the 
interest of the corporation? 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has erred in granting summary 
judgment on the basis of its interpretation of a contract not requiring resort to extrinsic 
evidence presents a question of law which is reviewed under a correction of error standard, 
with no deference accorded to the trial court's determination. Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 
7,118, 994 P.2d 193, 198 (quoting Zions First Natl Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 
749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988)). 
Issue Preserved: Appellant preserved the issue in the trial court by filing a 
memorandum in opposition to Appellee's motion for summary judgment on Appellant's 
claims. The rationale for the trial court's grant of Appellees' motion for summary 
judgment on Appellant's claims is the issue presented for review. 
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2. Issue: Did the trial court err when it denied Appellant's motion for partial 
summary judgment on Appellant's claims, refusing to rule that the Combined Agreement 
provides that Appellant contracted not to compete with Appellees? 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has erred in interpreting a contract 
presents a question of law which is reviewed under a correction of error standard, with no 
deference accorded to the trial court's determination. Id. 
Issue Preserved: Appellant preserved the issue in the trial court by filing a 
cross-motion for partial summary judgment on Appellant's claims. Having granted 
Appellees' motion for summary judgment on Appellant's claims, the trial court provided 
no written or verbal rationale for the denial of Appellant's cross-motion. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case arises from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Appellees Wasatch Management ("Wasatch"), Kenneth C. Jensen, Earlene B. Jensen, 
Steven K. Jensen, and Kevin J. Jensen (collectively hereinafter the "Jensens") on the 
claims of Appellant David L. Orlob ("Orlob"). The trial court therein ruled that Orlob 
is not a party to the Combined Agreement, the contract in question, and otherwise does not 
have an enforceable interest in the same. 
The Combined Agreement evidences an agreement to transfer to Wasatch and the 
Jensens all of the assets of Professional's Control Group, Inc. ("PCG"), which meant all 
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of the equipment and rights to service certain contracts. The contracts in question 
authorized PCG to provide billing services to certain physicians in exchange for 
commissions. In exchange for this consideration, Wasatch and the Jensens agreed to pay 
a lump sum for the equipment and a percentage of the future revenues to be generated from 
their providing the billing services. 
The contracts could be terminated by the physicians with 90 days' (and in some 
cases 30 days') notice. Therefore, to safeguard the present and future value of the 
contracts they had purchased, Wasatch and the Jensens also required Orlob to agree not 
to compete for the right to provide billing services to physicians in Utah. Orlob was the 
sole shareholder of PCG, and he alone had created good will with the physicians. PCG 
ceased doing business after the transaction. Thus, in the absence of a covenant not to 
compete in the Combined Agreement, Orlob could have, in his individual capacity, 
competed with Wasatch and the Jensens for the right to service the physician accounts. 
For several years after the transaction, Wasatch and the Jensens paid Orlob a 
percentage of the commissions they received from the servicing of the physician accounts 
that were the subject matter of the Combined Agreement. These payments were made by 
checks payable to Orlob individually. However, Wasatch and the Jensens ceased making 
payments to Orlob after they purchased, at an IRS auction, any interest of PCG (but not 
Orlob) in the Combined Agreement. Even though they had continued to pay Orlob well 
after PCG had been dissolved as a corporation, Wasatch and the Jensens claimed they were 
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justified in refusing to make any further payments because Orlob never had an individual 
interest in the Combined Agreement. The trial court, finding no genuine issue of material 
fact, agreed. 
As grounds for its ruling that Orlob does not have an enforceable interest in the 
Combined Agreement, the trial court relied exclusively upon ambiguous language in the 
contract's first paragraph, which purports to describe the contracting parties. However, 
the trial court disregarded other language contained within the four corners of the contract 
that clearly identifies Orlob's individual interest, and disregarded the conduct of the parties 
as indicative of their intent to include Orlob as a party. For example, the trial court 
disregarded the provision which states "Orlob further agrees and warrants he will not 
compete directly or indirectly in Utah against or adverse to Jensens in the billing and 
collection business for a period often years commencing August 1,1988," and disregarded 
the signature page which includes a signature line for "David L. Orlob, President," and 
a second signature line for "David L. Orlob, Individual." 
Moreover, the trial court has interpreted the Combined Agreement in a way that 
destroys its very purpose. Taken to its logical extreme, the trial court's interpretation 
means that Orlob was never constrained by the Combined Agreement. As such, 
immediately after affixing his signature above the line titled "David L. Orlob, Individual," 
Orlob was then free to begin competing with Wasatch and the Jensens for the same 
physician accounts PCG had just sold to them. 
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But given the nature of the contracts they had purchased through the Combined 
Agreement-namely, the only value of the contracts resided in the good will Orlob had 
created-Wasatch and the Jensens did not intend to allow Orlob to begin competing with 
them for the right to provide the billing services. The Wasatch and the Jensens instead 
intended to bind Orlob to a covenant not to compete, and there can be no doubt that had 
Orlob began to compete for that business after the Combined Agreement was signed, he 
would have been sued by Wasatch and the Jensens for breach of contract. The trial court 
misinterpreted the contract, and erroneously granted summary judgment. The trial court's 
ruling should be reversed and the case remanded for a trial. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
The parties submitted cross-motions for summary judgment on Orlob's claims. The 
trial court denied Orlob's motion for partial summary judgment on Orlob's claims, and 
granted Wasatch and the Jensens' motion for summary judgment on Orlob's claims. The 
trial court later entered a final judgment on Orlob's claims pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, after Wasatch and the Jensens stipulated to the withdrawal of 
their counterclaims against Orlob pending appeal of the entry of summary judgment in 
their favor, subject, however, to the right of Wasatch and the Jensens to renew their 
counterclaims in the event the Orlob were to prevail on appeal.1 (See attachments to 
1The parties have further stipulated that if the Appellant were to not prevail on 
appeal, then after the action is remanded to the trial court for consideration of the 
counterclaims, the Appellees will immediately submit the appropriate motion to dismiss 
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Appendix hereto, "C," "D," "E" and "F.") Orlob filed a timely appeal of the final 
judgment that was entered. (Appendix "H" hereto.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Professional' s Control Group, Inc. was a Utah corporation that did business 
in Salt Lake County, Utah. (R. 042; R. 063.) In January 1990, PCG was involuntarily 
dissolved for failing to file an annual report. (R. 459; R. 781.) 
2. David L. Orlob was the president and sole shareholder of PCG. (R. 042; R. 
063.) In or about October 1989, Orlob moved from Salt Lake City to Los Angeles, 
California. (R. 431.) 
3. On or about August 31, 1988, PCG, Orlob individually, Wasatch Medical 
Management, a Utah general partnership, and Kenneth C. Jensen, Earlene B. Jensen, 
Steven K. Jensen and Kevin J. Jensen, individually and in their representative capacities 
as general partners of Wasatch, entered into an agreement entitled "Combined Agreement" 
pursuant to which PCG agreed to transfer all of its assets to Wasatch and the Jensens in 
exchange for the payment of a lump sum for the purchase of equipment and certain future 
payments to Orlob, individually. (R. 042; R. 063.) A copy of the Combined Agreement 
is attached to the Appendix hereto as "A." (Id.) 
4. Wasatch and the Jensens describe the exchange as follows: 
their counterclaims, with prejudice. (Appendix "E" hereto.) 
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Pursuant to the [Combined] Agreement . . . , all of the assets and 
goodwill of [PCG] were transferred to [Wasatch and the Jensens] as 
of August 1, 1998. As of August 30, 1988, [PCG's] assets included 
office furniture and equipment in addition to the billing contracts with 
various physicians. After the sale of the assets, [Orlob] did not 
conduct any further business on behalf of [PCG]; nor did he file any 
further annual reports on [PCG] with the Secretary of State. 
Ultimately, [Orlob] allowed [PCG] to be dissolved by the Secretary 
of State. 
In entering into the [Combined] Agreement, [] Orlob intended to 
transfer his entire client base to [Wasatch and the Jensens], consisting 
at the time of some twenty-odd professional clients. Under the terms 
of the [Combined] Agreement, it was [] Orlob's responsibility to 
assist in the transfer of clients from PCG to [Wasatch and the 
Jensens]. He warranted that he would provide clients that were 
willing to pay 6 percent of their collections. He also agreed that he 
would not compete against [Wasatch and the Jensens], and would 
provide [them] with management training. [Internal citations omitted.] 
[R. 427-28.] 
5. The "Accounts Receivable Management Agreements" PCG had with 
physicians at the time of the transaction provided that either party could terminate the 
agreement with 90 days' (and in some cases 30 days') written notice. (R. 469-99.) 
6. After the transfer of assets, Orlob received numerous checks for 
"commissions" earned in connection with the Combined Agreement. These checks were 
made payable to "David L. Orlob," individually, and at least eleven of these checks were 
delivered to Orlob after PCG was dissolved as a Utah corporation. (R. 732-44.) 
7. On or about November 26,1990, the United States Internal Revenue Service 
("IRS") issued a public notice that it intended to sell PCG's interest, if any, in the 
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Combined Agreement pursuant to a Form 668-A Levy for taxes allegedly due and owing 
by PCG. (R. 629-30.) 
8. The Notice of Sale provided, in pertinent part, that "only the right, title and 
interest of Professional's Control Group in and to the [Combined Agreement] will be 
offered for sale." (Id.) 
9. On or about December 10, 1990, the IRS held the referenced public auction 
and, at that time, the Jensens purchased the property being sold by the IRS, which property 
was identified in the Notice of Sale. (R. 632.) 
10. Following the IRS auction, Wasatch ceased making payments to Orlob under 
the Combined Agreement. (R. 432.) 
11. Orlob, in his individual capacity, later sued Wasatch and the Jensens for 
breach of the Combined Agreement. (R. 001.) Wasatch and the Jensens in turn filed a 
counterclaim against Orlob, individually. (R. 062.) 
12. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Orlob's claims. 
(R. 422; R. 600.) The trial court granted Wasatch and the Jensens' motion for summary 
judgment on Orlob's claims by concluding that, as a matter of law, Orlob had no interest 
in the Combined Agreement, based solely on the language of the contract. (Transcript of 
oral argument before Hon. William B. Bohling, dated March 6, 2000, a copy of which is 
attached to the Appendix hereto as "B.") (R. 913, at 33-34.) 
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13. The trial court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law, a copy 
of which is attached to the Appendix hereto as "G." (R. 778-84.) With respect to the 
contract language, the trial court relied exclusively on the introductory paragraph of the 
Combined Agreement (R. 779-80; R. 913, at 33-34), which states: 
This agreement is made between two groups, namely: PROFESSIONAL'S 
CONTROL GROUP, INC., its principal shareholder David L. Orlob, 
hereinafter collectively referred to as ffOrlob," and WASATCH MEDICAL 
MANAGEMENT, A PARTNERSHIP, whose principal partners are Kenneth 
C. Jensen, Earlene B. Jensen, Steven K. Jensen and Keven J. Jensen, 
hereinafter collectively referred to as "Jensens." [R. 049.] 
14. The trial court also found that, as the sole shareholder and President of PCG, 
"Orlob and PCG, collectively, [agreed they] would not compete directly or indirectly 
against or adverse to the Defendants in the billing and collection service for a period often 
years commencing August 1, 1988." (R. 781.) 
15. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that: 
Pursuant to the terms of the Combined Agreement, references to 
"Orlob" refer to him not simply as an individual separate and apart from 
PCG, but refer to him only in his capacity as the President and principal 
shareholder of PCG. 
A corporation is capable of action only through the efforts of its 
officers or agents, and Plaintiff Orlob was such an officer and agent for 
purposes of the Combined Agreement. Thus, by its terms, the Combined 
Agreement seeks to bind the Plaintiff Orlob as the individual responsible for 
carrying out the obligations set forth therein on behalf of PCG. [R. 782-83.] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it failed to construe the contract so as 
to harmonize and give effect to all of its provisions. It also failed to give effect to the 
parties' intent, as evidenced by the contract language and the parties' course of conduct 
in performance of the contract. Properly construed, and as expressly provided, the 
contract language unambiguously includes Orlob individually as a party to the Combined 
Agreement. Specifically, the introductory language is ambiguous, but this ambiguity is 
clarified by harmonizing and giving effect to all of the contract's provisions. 
Alternatively, the contract is ambiguous, and the trial court erred when it failed to admit 
extrinsic evidence to explain the intent of the parties. This extrinsic evidence shows that 
the parties clearly intended to include Orlob as an individual party. 
The fundamental error of the trial court arises from the misapplication of law. The 
trial court based its ruling on a belief that, as a matter of law, a shareholder and officer of 
a corporation may not contract in his or her individual capacity with respect to the sale of 
the corporation's assets. Specifically, the trial court ruled that Orlob, individually, had no 
identity separate and distinct from PCG. No case law was cited by the trial court, or 
Wasatch and the Jensens, in support of this novel assertion. 
In fact, well-established case law holds that an officer, shareholder and director 
have identities separate and distinct from the corporation. It was legal error for the trial 
court to assert that, even though the Combined Agreement shows the parties' intent to 
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include Orlob as an individual party with an enforceable interest therein, Orlob could not 
as a matter of law have a separate legal existence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT DAVID L. ORLOB 
DOES NOT HAVE AN ENFORCEABLE INTEREST IN THE 
COMBINED AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED 
A. Governing Standards 
Summary judgment may be granted only if there has been a two-pronged showing 
"
v
 that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.'" Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24, f 25, 416 Utah Adv. 
Rep.39 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The court of appeals reviews the trial court's 
legal decisions for correctness, without deference, and reviews "the facts and inferences 
to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. (citing 
cases) (internal quotations omitted). 
The trial court interpreted the Combined Agreement as a matter of law. It did so 
without resort to extrinsic evidence, limiting itself to the four corners of the contract. (R. 
113, at 33-34.) "Whether contract language is ambiguous is a question of law. An 
ambiguity exists where the language v is reasonably capable of being understood in more 
than one sense.' v[W]hen a contract provision is ambiguous . . . extrinsic evidence is 
admissible to explain the intent of the parties.' If a contract is unambiguous, however, 
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a court may interpret [it] as a matter of law.' In so doing, a court must attempt to 
construe the contract so as to v harmonize and give effect to all of [its] provisions.'" Dixon 
v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89, 1 14, 987 P.2d 48, 52 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
,,vIn interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling.' If the 
contract is written and the language employed is not ambiguous, the parties' intentions are 
determined from the plain meaning of the language." Id. (quoting Winegar v. Froerer 
Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991)). 
Thus, the trial court could enter summary judgment in favor of Wasatch and the 
Jensens only if they showed that the contract is not ambiguous and can be read only to 
support their position (i.e., they are "entitled to judgment as a matter of law"), or, if the 
contract is ambiguous, that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact (i.e., any 
ambiguity in the contract can be resolved by resort to extrinsic evidence that is 
uncontroverted). 
B. The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law When It Granted Summary 
Judgment in Favor of Wasatch and the Jensens on Orloh's Claims 
1. Wasatch and the Jensens were not entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law because the law does not hold that a shareholder's interest in a 
contract is "inseparable" from any interest of the corporation. 
Whether the trial court erred when it ruled that the contract unambiguously 
expresses the intent of the parties to exclude Orlob in his individual capacity requires a 
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review, in the first instance, of the four corners of the Combined Agreement to determine 
whether the language is reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense. 
Dixon, 1999 UT 89 at \ 14, 987 P.2d at 52. The trial court placed exclusive reliance on 
the introductory paragraph of the Combined Agreement to conclude that Orlob is not an 
individual party. (R. 779-80; R. 913, at 33-34.) 
The introductory paragraph, which was drafted by Wasatch and the Jensens, states 
in pertinent part that the contract is made between two groups, the first of which is 
described as "PROFESSIONAL'S CONTROL GROUP, INC., its principal shareholder 
David L. Orlob, hereinafter collectively referred to as 'Orlob.'" (R. 049.) The 
introductory paragraph is the only text in the contract that is not a numbered paragraph. 
(R. 049-59.) 
The description of the first group of parties is, standing alone, ambiguous. The 
decision to describe the first group as "PROFESSIONAL'S CONTROL GROUP, INC." 
and yet make collective use of the term "Orlob" to refer to the first group in the body of 
the contract is confusing. It served no purpose to include any reference to Orlob, and 
thereby purport to impose personal obligations on him, if PCG was to be the only member 
of the so-called Orlob "Group": "'The general rule is that a corporation is an entity 
separate and distinct from its officers, shareholders and directors and they will not be held 
personally liable for the corporation's debts and obligations.'" Redeker v. Salisbury, 952 
P.2d 577, 582 (Utah App. 1998) {quoting Melko v. Dionisto, 580 N.E.2d 586, 594 (111. 
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App. 1991)). Thus, if PCG was to be the only member of the Orlob "Group," then the 
contract would have used PCG to refer to the first party to the contract, and it would not 
be a "group." 
The confusion created by the introductory paragraph is compounded by the way in 
which the Orlob "Group" is referenced in the body of the contract. Although the 
introductory paragraph states otherwise, The Combined Agreement does not make 
collective use of the term "Orlob" throughout the contract. Instead, when in the contract 
Wasatch and the Jensens desired to refer explicitly to PCG, they did so. For example, 
paragraph 16 states, in pertinent part: "All existing, incurred and/or accrued debts, 
liabilities and/or expenses connected with the Professional's Control Group as of 
December 31, 1988 are the sole responsibility of Orlob, and Orlob agrees to hold Jensens 
harmless of said obligations and permit offset to above accounts."2 (R. 054.) It could 
reasonably be expected that Wasatch and the Jensens would want to ensure that payment 
of PCG's obligations was guaranteed by Orlob since PCG would cease to exist as a going 
concern after all of its assets were transferred as part of the transaction. 
2
 Other paragraphs provide for a similar distinction between PCG and Orlob. 
Paragraph 1 states: "Professional's Control Group, Inc., along with its principal officer, David 
L. Orlob, has operated a billing and collection service for anesthesiologists and a service 
bureau that sends out monthly billing statements for other professionals." (R. 049.) 
Paragraphs 11 states, in pertinent part: "Not by way of limitation but said expenses include 
payroll, rent payment, postage, insurance, and phone bills, so that as of December 31, 1988 
all outstanding or accrued bills connected with the Professional's Control Group are paid by 
Orlob." (R. 052-53.) 
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Moreover, the Orlob "Group" is continually referred to as "he." For example, 
paragraph 5 of the Combined Agreement states that "For commissions paid and profits 
shared Orlob warrants that he will assist in the orderly transfer of all accounts to Jensens 
and assist Jensens to maintain the accounts over the life of the this Agreement." Similarly, 
paragraph 6 states that "Orlob further agrees and warrants he will not compete directly or 
indirectly in Utah against or adverse to Jensens in the billing and collection business for 
a period of ten years commencing August 1, 1988." (Emphasis added.) (R. 050.) 
Obviously, the reference to "he" in these paragraphs refers to an individual and could not 
have meant the corporate entity, PCG, which would be referred to as "it." 
As such, the introductory paragraph's description of the Orlob "Group" is at least 
reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense. It could mean only PCG, 
as Wasatch and the Jensens contend, or it could mean PCG and Orlob, as the above-recited 
inconsistencies of the contract indicate. The introductory paragraph is therefore 
ambiguous without reference to any other language. The trial court disregarded other 
language within the four corners of the document which, when harmonized with the 
introductory paragraph, clarify the ambiguity. 
The clearest indication of the intent of the parties to include Orlob as an individual 
party to the contract separate and distinct from PCG is found at the signature page. The 
signature page contains a signature line for PCG, which is signed by "David L. Orlob, 
President," and another signature line which is signed by "David L. Orlob, Individual." 
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(R. 056.) There was no reason of any kind to include a signature line for Orlob in his 
individual capacity if he had no identity separate and distinct from PCG. " [T]he individual 
who signs for a corporation is not a party to the contract, . . . " Gardner v. Madsen, 949 
P.2d 785, 789 (Utah App. 1997). Thus, since Orlob signed the contract twice, it must be 
presumed that he did so in a dual capacity. The fact that the contract Wasatch and the 
Jensens prepared required Orlob to sign in his individual capacity necessarily means that 
Wasatch and the Jensens intended to make a contract with Orlob separate and distinct from 
PCG. 
The word "Orlob" is referenced throughout the body of the Combined Agreement, 
as well as the word "he," but not, as noted above, in every instance. That most references 
in the contracts are to "Orlob" is understandable since all executory acts to be performed 
by the Orlob "Group" were to be performed by Orlob, individually. PCG ceased doing 
business after the transfer of all its assets to Wasatch and the Jensens. (R. 428.) Thus, 
for example, the Combined Agreement identifies the following executory acts to be 
performed by the Orlob "Group": 
For commissions paid and profits shared Orlob warrants that he will 
assist in the orderly transfer of all accounts to Jensens and assist Jensens to 
maintain the accounts over the life of this Agreement, [if 5.] 
It is the intent of the parties that Orlob receive and Jensens pay 
commissions of $7,500 per month so long as each anesthesiologist listed on 
Schedule "B" subscribes to Jensen's services. . . . Furthermore, except for 
replacement anesthesiologists, it is the intent of the parties that Jensens pay 
Orlob an additional 1.5 % or the 1 % commission, depending on time periods, 
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for each anesthesiologist Orlob persuades to subscribe to Jensens' services. 
It is understood that there shall be no commissions paid after July 31, 1994. 
[19.] 
It is also the intent that during the transition period of August 1, 1998 
through December 1,1988 that Orlob will perform the duties of management 
and administration training. As compensation for those services Orlob will 
receive 75% of the company profits. . . . [1 10.] [R. 050-52.] 
In a similar regard, paragraph 6 of the Combined Agreement provided that, in 
exchange for the payment of commissions over a term of five years, Orlob agreed he 
would "not compete directly or indirectly in Utah against or adverse to Jensens in the 
billing and collection business for a period of ten years commencing August 1,1988." (R. 
050.) Of the provisions in the Combined Agreement, paragraph 6 most clearly evidences 
the intent of the parties to make Orlob a party in his individual capacity. 
It was the intent of the parties to transfer of all the assets of PCG to Wasatch and 
the Jensens. (R. 427-28.) At the time of the transaction, PCG's assets consisted of 
equipment the parties valued at $15,000 (R. 050.), and approximately twenty contracts to 
provide billing services to anesthesiologists. (R. 913, at 8.) Because these contracts could 
be terminated by either party with 90 days' (and in some cases 30 days') notice (R. 469-
99), the real value of the contracts inhered in the goodwill established by Orlob. See 
Southern Utah Mortuary v. Roger D. Olpin Southern Utah Mortuaries, 116 P.2d 945, 948 
(Utah App. 1989) ("the sale of a business presumptively includes the sale of the business's 
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good will, even though it is not specified."). But with PCG defunct after the sale of all its 
assets, it was Orlob individually who knew and had the good will of the physician clients. 
After PCG transferred all of its assets and ceased doing business, Orlob could have, 
in the absence of a promise binding on him in his individual capacity, begun competing (in 
his individual capacity) for the right to provide billing services to the physicians. See Allen 
v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 827 (Utah 1951) ("when the individual responsible 
for creating the good will and the business to which it attaches, become separated, it is 
necessary to preserve that good will to the business by a covenant in ^ an area where his 
personal reputation will detach the old customers from the old business."). For Wasatch 
and the Jensens, such a result could have rendered the contracts they had just purchased 
worthless. By including the covenant not to compete in the Combined Agreement, 
Wasatch and the Jensens obviously intended to preserve the good will purchased from PCG 
by paying Orlob, individually, commissions for five years in exchange for his individual 
agreement not to compete for ten years. 
The response of Wasatch and the Jensens to these arguments is at the core of the 
trial court's ruling. Wasatch and the Jensens contend that they purchased the good will of 
PCG, and that the covenant not to compete applied to PCG alone. (R. 432-36.) They 
further believe that they owe no obligations to Orlob personally because, they contend, by 
applying to PCG, the covenant not to compete necessarily extended to Orlob in his 
capacity as an officer and shareholder of PCG. (Id.) Thus, the trial court concluded, "by 
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its terms, the Combined Agreement seeks to bind the Plaintiff Orlob as the individual 
responsible for carrying out the obligations set forth therein on behalf of PCG." (R. 783.) 
Further, "All of the obligations of Plaintiff Orlob with respect to the Combined Agreement 
are inextricably intertwined with his status as President and sole shareholder of that closely 
held corporation, and none of those obligations relate to his status solely as an individual 
unrelated to the corporate entity." {Id.) 
This legal conclusion, that a contract with a corporation renders unnecessary the 
need to bind an officer and shareholder in his or her individual capacity, is novel and 
indeed unsupported by any authority cited by Wasatch or the Jensens. Stated differently, 
the trial court concluded that although Orlob individually had duties to Wasatch and the 
Jensens through the Combined Agreement, he had no rights to payment as a pari v W ere 
it not incorrect, such a conclusion would smack of indentured servitude. 
In support of the trial court's conclusions, Wasatch and the Jensens assert that 
Orlob's ownership of stock does not translate to ownership of corporate assets, and that 
the individual interest of Orlob in the Combined Agreement is "inseparable" from PCG's 
interest. (R. 432-36.) They argue thai ftie right to receive payments under the Combined 
Agreement is an asset of PCG, not Orlob. (Id.) In making these arguments, Wasatch and 
the Jensens seek to combine the questions of what consideration was given and what value 
it had. 
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Wasatch and the Jensens argue that PCG sold its equipment and its physician 
contracts and that the corporation owned no other assets. (Id.) That contention is 
misleading. The corporation did sell its equipment. Orlob received the proceeds paid by 
Wasatch and the Jensens to PCG for that equipment. The corporation did transfer its 
physician contracts, but those alone had no substantial value.3 In order to create real value 
through those contracts, future billing services had to be provided to physicians. The value 
comes from payment for those future services to be rendered. Wasatch, not PCG, was 
going to, and in fact did, render those services and thus received payments under the 
contracts for services rendered. 
What is omitted from Wasatch and the Jensens' discussion is goodwill. The 
goodwill of PCG, its real value, came through Orlob's personal dealings with the 
physicians. Thus, the value to the purchasers of that goodwill was protected by Orlob, 
individually, agreeing not to compete with Wasatch and the Jensens. It is the covenant not 
to compete, or protection of goodwill against competition by Orlob, individually, that was 
the consideration for payments to be made after the price for the equipment was paid. 
That individual covenant not to compete clearly held value to Wasatch and the Jensens, 
who agreed to pay substantial amounts for it over the course of five years, and those 
3
 The contracts purchased contain 90-day, or in some cases 30 days, written 
cancellation provisions, such that any physician could cancel the contract with defendants 
and commence business instead with Orlob within the applicable time period, but for Orlob's 
non-compete agreement. (R. 469-99.) Thus, any value in the contracts themselves was de 
minimum compared to the value of Orlob's agreement not to compete. 
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payments were in fact made for over two years to Orlob, individually, in exchange for his 
honoring his promise not to compete. If Orlob had not so agreed, the physician contracts 
would have been effectively worthless. 
Wasatch and the Jensens effectively acknowledged this in the trial court when they 
asserted they are excused from making any payments because Orlob, individually, failed 
to perform his individual obligations under the agreement between the parties. (R. 434-
35.) 
Wasatch and the Jensens quote Commercial National Bank v. Chambers, 61 P. 560 
(Utah), aff'd, 182 U.S. 556 (1904), as support for their proposition that stock ownership 
is "not an indebtedness due the owner, but simply an interest in the assets or property of 
the corporation^]" (R. 435.) Commercial National Bank was a suit filed by a taxpayer 
seeking a refund of taxes, has no application in the context here and the* brief quotation by 
Wasatch and the Jensens is found only in that court's analysis of the appropriate 
methodology to be used in valuing stock.4 That case does not hold, as no case does, that 
a shareholder may not be paid individually for a covenant not to compete. 
Young Farms Ltd. v. Richtron, Inc., 176 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989), also cited by 
Wasatch and the Jensens (R. 434-35), is even less apposite. The facts in that case which 
4
 The language cited by Wasatch and the Jensens is contained in the court's analysis 
of the appropriate method of valuing property for taxation purposes. Id. at 562. 
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Wasatch and the Jensens sought to apply in the trial court were summarized by the Young 
Farms court as follows: 
. . . Young Farms moved for a partial summary judgment against Richtron 
and Paul Richins, declaring that they had no right, title, or interest in any of 
the partnership properties. This motion was based on the fact that the 
Internal Revenue Service had sold at a tax sale all of the interest of Richtron 
in the partnership properties to one Milton Goff, who then subsequently 
assigned his interests to Young Farms. The court granted the motion, 
decreeing that Richtron and Paul Richins had no right, title, or interest in the 
partnership properties, and dismissed them from the lawsuit. 
Id. at 56. That case, however, concerned a partnership, the interest of a withdrawn 
general partner and, only incidentally, the impact of a tax sale on the withdrawn partner's 
indirect interest in properties held by the partnership itself. It has no application to the 
instant situation, which concerns Orlob's individual interest in being paid the consideration 
for his personal covenant not to compete. 
In short, Wasatch and the Jensens failed to cite any authority for their proposition 
that they could impose contractual duties upon Orlob due to his position as an officer and 
shareholder of the corporation but without ever making him a party to the contract. In 
reality, the proposition is unsupportable in light of the facts and law bearing upon this 
issue. 
The Combined Agreement is unambiguous in its treatment of Orlob as an individual 
party to its terms. This conclusion follows from harmonizing the language of the 
Combined Agreement, and in particular squaring the introductory language with the 
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language in the separate provisions and the signature page. Viewed along with the other 
language which clearly evidences an intent to make Orlob a party to the contract in his 
individual capacity, and especially with respect to the covenant not to compete, the 
introductory language should be construed to mean that the Orlob "Group" in fact consists 
of both PCG and Orlob. References in the body of the contract to "Orlob" must include 
Orlob in his individual capacity, and references to "Professional's Control Group" must 
mean PCG alone. 
Because the Combined Agreement is unambiguous in its treatment of Orlob as an 
individual party, the trial court erred when it ruled that Wasatch and the Jensens are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
2. Orlob established the existence of a genuine issue of material tact 
because the course of conduct of the parties indicates they intended to 
include Orlob as an individual party to the contract. 
In the event this Court finds that the ambiguity in the Combined Agreement cannot 
be resolved without resort to extrinsic evidence, alternative grounds exist to reverse the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Wasatch and the Jensens. Specifically, 
Orlob set forth facts, extrinsic to the contract, in the trial court which established the 
existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact, thereby precluding summary judgment. 
Determining the meaning of a contract by extrinsic evidence ordinarily presents 
questions for the fact finder. Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1358 (Utah 
1996). 
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For a period of approximately ten months after PCG was dissolved as a Utah 
corporation in January 1990, and up to the IRS auction on December 19, 1990, Wasatch 
and the Jensens continued to make checks payable to Orlob personally for commissions 
earned under the Combined Agreement. The checks for this period are all made payable 
to "David L. Orlob." (R. 732-44.) 
The doctrine of practical construction holds that "the parties, by their action and 
performance, have demonstrated what was their meaning and intent/' Lake Philgas 
Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Company, 845 P.2d 951, 957 (Utah App. 1993).5 
Thus, by their longstanding conduct, Wasatch and the Jensens clearly demonstrated 
their intention to contract with and obligate themselves to pay Orlob in his individual 
capacity. The unavoidable inference, which must be drawn in favor of Orlob as the non-
5In Upland Industries Corporation v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Company, 684 P.2d 
638, 642 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court stated that a construction given to a contract 
by the acts and conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, before any 
controversy has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight, and will, 
when reasonable, be adopted and enforced by the Court. The reason 
underlying the rule is that it is the duty of the court to give effect to the 
intention of the parties where it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal 
interpretation of the terms of the contract, and a practical construction placed 
by the parties upon the instrument is the best evidence of their intention. 
Id. (quoting Smith v. Arthur D. Little, Inc., 276 California Assoc. L. App. 2d 391 (Cal. App. 
1969)). See also: Provo River Water Users Association v. Lambert, 642 P.2d 1219, 1227 
(Utah 1982) ("if there is inconsistency or doubt about the language used in a document, the 
practical construction placed on it, as shown by the actions of the parties, should be given 
consideration, and may be regarded as persuasive."). 
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moving party, is that Wasatch and the Jensens believed Orlob was individually a party to 
the Combined Agreement with duties not to compete. See EIE v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 
638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981) (holding that defendant's course of conduct of 
reimbursing plaintiff 90% of each bill rather than a flat $90 fee was "indication of their 
[the parties'] intention."). The actions of Wasatch and the Jensens prior to the IRS 
auction, and prior to this litigation, are the best indication of their intent, and should be 
enforced. 
The foregoing evidence that was placed before the trial court raised a genuine issue 
as to any material fact. Accordingly, the trial court erred when, in the presence of 
disputed facts bearing upon the ambiguity in the contract, it entered summary judgment in 
favor of Wasatch and the Jensens. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING DENYING 
ORLOB's MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED 
A. The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law When It Denied Partial Summary 
Judgment in Favor of Orlob 
1. Orlob is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because he has shown 
the Combined Agreement ambiguously includes him as an individual 
party. 
As shown above in section LB. 1., the Combined Agreement is unambiguous in its 
treatment of Orlob as an individual party to its terms. Accordingly, the trial court erred 
when it denied Orlob's motion for partial summary on the interpretation of the contract. 
2. Orlob is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because he has shown 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the incontroverted 
evidence shows that the parties intended to include Orlob as an 
individual party to the contract. 
While determining the meaning of a contract by extrinsic evidence ordinarily 
presents questions for the fact finder, Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1358 
(Utah 1996), as shown above in section LB.2., the undisputed facts in this case, as well 
as common sense and experience, clearly establish that Orlob, individually, was a 
contracting party with respect to the covenant not to compete. The evidence presented on 
the course of conduct of the parties, and in particular Wasatch and the Jensens' continuous 
payments to Orlob individually after PCG was dissolved, establishes this conclusion. The 
facts concerning Wasatch and the Jensens' course of conduct were uncontroverted. 
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Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied Orlob's motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
David L. Orlob respectfully requests the following relief: 
1. That the trial court's order granting Wasatch and the Jensens' motion for 
summary judgment on Orlob's claims be reversed, and the trial court's entry of judgment 
in favor of Wasatch and the Jensens on Orlob's claims be vacated and the case remanded; 
and 
2. That the trial court's order denying Orlob's motion for partial summary 
judgment on Orlob's claims be reversed, and this action be remanded to the trial court with 
instructions to enter partial summary judgment in favor of Orlob on his claims that he has 
an enforceable interest in the Combined Agreement that survived tlir 1R S juttion of PCG's 
interest therein, if any. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of March, 2001. 
PARSONS, DAVIS, KINGHORN & PETERS 
DAVID W. SCOHELD 
DAVID J. BURNS 
Attorneys for Appellant David L. Orlob 
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a r-*~ n ~ m ra * lace retween ~*~ wo groups, namely: 
??wO- ESSIONAL] S CONTROL GR.DU?, INI., lis principal shareholder 
David 1. Orlob, hereafter coiiecrivelv referred to as "Orlcb-" 
and WASATCH MEDICAL MANAGEMENT, A PARTNERSHIP, whose principal 
partners are Kenneth C. Jensen, Eariene B. Jensen, Steven I". 
Jensen and Keven J. Jensen, hereinafter collectively referred to 
as ''Jensens. " 
principal officer, David Or lob, ha.s operated a billing and 
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•1. Professional's Control Group, Inc., along with its 
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collection service for anesthesiologists and a service bureau 
that sends out monthly billing statements for other profession-
als. Jo: private reasons Orlob now wishes to terminate these 
services and sell their equipment to Jensens. Jensens are will-
ing to pay Orlob commissions on collections for ail anesthesiologists 
Orlob can turn over to Jensens. Jensens have for a long period of 
time conducted a similar business in the Ogden area and recently 
exuanded in Salt Lake. Jensens are willing to purchase the equip-
ment and pay commissions on collections as hereinbelow set forth. 
Jensens are also willing to share profits earned on Service Bureau 
accounts. 
2. Effective August 1, 19B3 Jensens shall purchase 
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• n s D i f i - u2~.v a t t a c h e d h e r e t o and made a 
o a r r of t h i s Acr^earner^t. 
2 . Z i f e r t i v e "he same d a t e J e n s e n s s h a l l s e r v i c e in a 
p r o f e s s i o n a l manner a l l fo rmer Orlob a n e s t h e s i o l o g i s t s as l i s t e d 
on S c h e d u l e "B" a t t a c h e d h e r e t o and made a p a r t of t h i s Agreement . 
4 . E f f e c t i v e t h e same d a t e J e n s e n s s h a l l t a k e c o n t r o l 
and o p e r a t e t h e S e r v i c e Bureau which c o n s i s t s of s e r v i c e t o C. 
Kilmen C a s t l e , M.D. , P e r r y A. P e t e r s o n , M.D. , L i o n e l Z. weeks, M.D. 
and a l l m ic ro f i l m i n g c l i e n t s . J e n s e n s w a r r a n t t h a t t hey w i l l 
s e r v i c e a l l p r e v i o u s c l i e n t e l e i n a p r o f e s s i o n a l manner . 
5. For c o m m i s s i o n s p a i d and. p r o f i t s s h a r e d Orlob 
w a r r a n t s t h a t he w i l l a s s i s t i n t h e o r d e r l y t r a n s f e r of a i l 
a c c o u n t s t o J e n s e n s and a s s i s t J e n s e n s t o m a i n t a i n t h e a c c o u n t s 
o v e r t h e l i f e of t h i s Agreemen t . 
6. Or lob f u r t h e r a g r e e s and w a r r a n t s he w i l l n o t 
compe te d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y i n Utah a g a i n s t o r a d v e r s e t o 
J e n s e n s i n t h e b i l l i n g and c o l l e c t i o n b u s i n e s s f o r a p e r i o d of 
t e n y e a r s commencing Augus t 1, 19BB. 
PAYMENTS: 
7. For payment of the equipment listed on Schedule 
"A" Jensens shall pay Orlob $15,00Dr payable $7,500 on or before 
September 25th and another 57,500 on or before October 25, 1988. 
8. For Orlob's assistance in -the transfer and main- d 
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oes with Jensens for any reason, a calculation of 
1.5% cf the average pas: 12 months' collections shall be made and 
that amount shall be reduced from the next 57,500 per month commis-
sion- However/ in the even: Jensens and/or Orlob are able to persuade 
other replacement anesthesiologists to subscribe to Jensens' services 
during the commission period the percentages and ceilings shall be 
reolaced to the extent that Orlob shall receive $7,5 00 per month in 
the form of commissions. Also, in the event .Orlob and Jensens jointly 
are able to persuade cthsr anesthesiologists to subscribe to Jensens' 
services, Orlob will be paid a 1.5% commission during the commission 
oeriod exceot as modified for the sixth year. The commission period 
commences October 1, 198S and terminates July 31, 19 94. However, for 
the sixth year, beginning August 1, 1993 through July 31, 1994 the 
percentages shall be 1% and the ceiling or maximum payment for the 
listed anesthesiologists shall be reduced to $5,000 per month- Each 
commission payment shall be due on or before the 25th day of the 
following month. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Orlob warrants 
that ail listed • " d,' J yV j ^ ' -anesthesiologists accounts must be 
willing to pay o% of total collections for services rendered. 
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and Jensens ?ay commissions rf ?7r5D0 per month so lone as each 
anesthesiologists listed on Schedule "3f1 subscribes to Jensen's 
services. In the event any anesthesiologist shall terminate 
collections services the 1.5% of the 12-month average collections 
are to reduce the 3 7r50 0 monthly commission. It is, however, the 
intent that should either Jensens or Crlob replace a terminating 
anesthesiologist the full 57,500 commission be paid except as 
modified by the sixth year. Furthermore; except for retlacement 
anesthesiologists; it is the intent of the parties that Jensens 
pay Orlob an additional 1.5% or the 1% commission, depending on 
time periods, for each anesthesiologist Crlob persuades to sub-
scribe to Jensens' services It is understood that there shall 
be no commissions earned after July 31, 19 94. 
10. It is -also the intent that during the transition 
period of August 1, 19B8 through December 1, 19B3 that Orlob will 
perform the duties of-management and administration training. As 
compensation for those services Orlob will receive 75% of the 
company profits. These profits will be determined after ail 
monthly expenses have been paid- These expenses will include the 
$7,500 commission payment to Orlob and a 32,000 salary payment to 
Jensens. Jensens will receive the remaining 25% of said profits. 
11. Jensens are now operating the Service Bureau and 
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anesthesiologists and the Service Bureau, Crlob agrees to oav all 
e;:?snses up through December 31. 1SBE. This includes all exoenses 
incurred or accrued through December 31, 19 36. Not by vav of 
limitation but said expanses include payroll, rent payment, 
postage, insurance, and phone bills, so that as of December 31, 
1988 all outstanding or accrued bills connected with the Professional' 
Control Group are paid by Orlob. 
12. Fcr the Service Bureau a separate accounting and 
control system for income and expanses shall be maintained by 
Jar.se.p~s. A determination between the parties shall be made as to 
the expenses of operation fcr December and until Orlob has been 
repaid that certain amount Orlob shall receive 50% of all profits 
from the Service Bureau, in addition Orlob will" be reoaid ?500 
oer month as reoevment of December 19B8 expanses. At the time Orlob 
has received repayment of the forenamed December expenses the per-
centage profit shall be reduced to 20% -of said net profits, the.same 
to be paid to Orlob on or before the 15th day of the following month. 
Accurate books and records will be maintained by Jensens to determine 
net orofits and reasonable allocations will be made so that Service 
Bureau orotf readily determined. Profits are usually de-
termined after all -expenses attributable to the Service Bureajjzvi 
functions are paid. The profit sharing commissions, as above out-
lined,, shall continue until termination of this Agreement, which is 
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OTHER COMMTTMZNTS : 
14. Orlob ooeraced a collection acrencv and for tine 
first six months under one terms of -his Agreement all collection 
accounts of former Orlob olienueie shall be referred io Mr. Orlob's 
collection agency for ultimate collection excepc where individual 
crcfessionais r ecru esc orhervrise . 
15. To one e::oent reasonably possible, Jensens agree co 
recain former Orlob employees as Jensens employees at present 
tenure and salaries-
16. Ail exisuing, incurred and/or accrued debts, liabil-
ities and/or expenses connected with uhe Professional's Control 
Group as of December 31, 1988 are the sole responsibility of Orlob, 
and Orlob agrees to hold Jensens harmless of said obligations and 
oermit offset to above amounts. 
17. At each year-end, Jensens shall prepare and deliver to 
Orlob a 1099 form, designating commissions paid. Orlob, during the 
term of -his Agreement, shall have reasonable access at reasonable 
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18. Effective Augusr 1. 193B Cricb grants to Jensens a 
three-year term lease on -he present business premises wherein 
:ontinue the business operations. Ihs monthly 
hall be calculated at Elr250 per month; less the average 
utility cost over the lasc 12 months. This vrill be paid in ad-
vance, however, not delinquent until the 2£ch o£ each month. 
Because of Orion1s earlier commitment to pay all expenses said 
lease payment shall not commence until January 1, 198 9. All 
repairs^ taxes, and maintenance of the outside premises shall be 
borne by Orlob. Cleaning and normal services inside shall be 
express option to purchase said premises up through and including 
August 31r 1991. The purchase price and terms shall be negotiated 
but the same shall not be more than the fair market value. 
19. Orlob desires to remain and have his present 
office in said office complex until December 1, 19 88. The same 
is granted Orlob without charge. Orlob is also granted half-time 
use of his present secretary agreeing, however, to reimburse the 
Jensens for one-half of her reasonable costs as billed monthly-
Orlob will also have the option to remain in his present office 
for an addition of four (4) months through March 31, 19 89. How-
ever, if Orlob exercises that option, the monthly lease payment 
that Jensens pay "will be reduced by the percentage of square 






20 , In uhe e v e n t cf a d e d a u l r i n an' 
— * - i , ^ 7 — a s m a ^ " m e — a t * ' — - - * . — 7 - - —— -
—.—m- s n a —«. D S d . v a n 
n n T a - ^ - n n r s — * Ti n "" •"•»-*— o --
the non-dadaul ring party is entitled to money damages only- The 
oarties vrill not be entitled to rescission nor injunctive relief. 
21. Parties durther achnowledcre "that . in event, od a de-" 
faul't the non-defaulting parr]. v aiii. .1 be entitled "to all costs, 
including reasonable attorney fees, to enforce the terms and 
conditions of this Agreement against the defaulting party. Each 
tart}' further acknowledges that this Agreement represents all cf 
the terms and conditionsr understanding and duties of the parties 
and that there are no other agreements not contained within this 
Agreement. 
22. This Agreement is intended to be effective as od 
August ir 1938 and all parties acknowledge that they have 
authority to sign and that this is a legalr binding Agreement. 
DATED this O / day of August, 19BE. 
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DAVID L. ORLOB, 
Plaintiff, 
WASATCH MANAGEMENT, 
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BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
652 West Jefferson Cove 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
801-567-1157 
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185 South State, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, MARCH 6, 2000; 10:10 A.M. 
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. BOHLING, JUDGE PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We'll go on record in the matter of 
Professional's Control Group versus Wasatch Medical Management, 
et al., case number 910901061. 
Counsel, would you make appearances, please? 
MR. BURNS: David Burns and David Scofield for the 
plaintiff David Orlob, your Honor. 
MR. HASKINS: James Haskins, Tom Thompson for 
defendants in this matter, your Honor. Good morning. 
THE COURT: Counsel, we're here on a number of 
motions. I think the first motion I want to hear is the 
defense motion for summary judgment, I have received courtesy 
copies from both sides, and I think I'm somewhat familiar with 
the facts and the law that's being argued. I think these are 
serious motions and matters to be taken with some care, so I 
invite you to fully inform me of your positions on this matter. 
MR. HASKINS: One issue I wanted to address first, 
your Honor. We just received this morning plaintiffs' response 
to our response to their motions for summary judgment. When we 
conversed with Melba — 
When was it, Melba? 
- Wednesday or Thursday, in setting this date, we 
understood that all of the responses, based upon 
representations of counsel, had been filed. And I assumed from 
that we had received them. 
They were mailed to us on the first. Our office 
received them late Friday. Mr. Thompson and I were both gone. 
We saw them for the first time this morning. So we're not 
prepared to address - which I think we should appropriately be 
prepared to address - what they — I have incorporated in the 
responses which we first saw at 9:30 this morning, so I haven't 
had a chance to even review those. They're fairly voluminous. 
THE COURT: We are ready to go ahead with your motion 
for summary judgment and their response to that? 
MR. HASKINS: We are. We are. We filed that clear 
back in August of last year. If you remember the Court had 
stated in a pretrial — we had filed these motions previously 
before Judge Rokich and argued this before Judge Rokich back in 
1993, and had included affidavits in support of our position, 
and the court asked us to file supplemental motions and motions 
for summary judgment again to again readdress those issues. 
We did that. In fact, the court gave us 30 days to 
do that. We did ours within 30 days of the pretrial. We just 
received plaintiffs' motion several weeks ago, some five or six 
months after what I thought we had agreed at the formal 
pretrial. That's why we filed our motion to continue the 
trial. 
Judge Rokich denied both of our motions back in 1993, 
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1 and thus we are here arguing those motions again. The Court 
2 was going to readdress those issues today. 
3 I Mr. Thompson's going to be arguing these motions. I 
4 J just wanted to bring that to the Court. If the Court is going 
5 to hear argument, I'd like a chance to respond, after review, 
6 to their response to our motions for summary judgment. 
7 THE COURT: All right. 
8 What's the position of the plaintiffs in this matter? 
9 MR. BURNS: Well, your Honor, I refer the Court to 
10 the amended scheduling order that Mr. Haskins prepared. We 
11 filed our motion for summary judgment on the cutoff date of 
12 February 7th for the scheduling order, and there was a 
13 shortened briefing period. Their response was then due on the 
14 14th of February. We didn't receive those responses until the 
15 23rd of February, and then we filed our reply on the 1st of 
16 March. So I'm little bit surprised to hear - which I wasn't 
17 i told last week — we would have provided copies immediately had 
18 we been told that they had not received our replies. 
19 I And I can't specifically say that I breezed through 
20 the conversation, but I'm pretty sure that we discussed the 
21 fact the we had filed replies. So if fault is to be attributed 
22 with respect to the motions that we filed, as to whether those 
23 i are before the Court today, I think that lies with the 
24 J defendants' counterclaim. 
25 And that's the basis for our objection to the motion 
1 to continue trial as well, that they have requested to continue 
2 the trial because they say that there are issues pending 
3 through those motions which cannot be determined equitably 
4 j before trial. Our position is to heavily adhere to the 
5 scheduling order, that we would — clearly have had time. 
6 There was one flaw in the scheduling order, I might 
7 I point out, that apparently time had not been set aside for the 
8 motions for summary judgment. A scheduling order had been set 
9 I asidef a trial date, et cetera, cutoff dates, but for some 
10 reason it slipped through the cracks, a specific day for oral 
11 I argument on the motions. But in any event, if that schedule 
12 [ had been adhered to I don't think we'd be having this — having 
13 to address this issue today. 
14 j THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
15 MR. BURNS: Our preference, our desire, would be to 
16 I go forward with the motions that the plaintiff has filed, if 
17 j need be — and think we can step up and look at those. And I 
18 | would submit that there is nothing new in those motions at all. 
19 This case has been pending since 1991. The arguments of 
20 j counsel on both sides are well known. The day they filed their 
21 motion for summary judgment, which essentially is — we have 
22 | cross-moved on the same issue. 
23 The Court is going to have to decide it whichever way 
24 it decides it. That will be dispositive of both positions, 
25 basically. So the only part that is outside that is we've also 
1 moved for summary judgment on their claims, their counterclaim. 
2 So we would like to go forward on both of those issues today. 
3 THE COURT: Now, just for the record, if I understand 
4 it, neither side is objecting to the Court hearing these 
5 I motions, rather than simply deferring to the earlier ruling of 
6 Judge Rokich, that I allow supplementation and re-argument with 
7 the consent of both sides; is that correct? 
8 MR. BURNS: That is correct, your Honor. 
9 MR. HASKINS: That's correct, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: And I think what I - I'd like to hear 
11 J argument on everything, and what I'll do, it seems to me, once 
12 we get to the point where the part Mr. Haskins has not had a 
13 chance to fully review, I'm going to — I'll take a recess, if 
14 [ you'd like, let you go out and take a look at it. We'll come 
15 back in, and if you need more time, I'll look at it then. 
16 But we've got the rest of the morning to get this 
17 done, and frankly, we've got a trial set for next week, and if 
18 we can get this resolved one way or the other, I'd really 
19 prefer to do it. 
20 I think everybody's interest is served. This is a 
21 I case that's been around for a long time, and it seems to me, 
22 looking at the briefs and at the paperwork, that it's something 
23 that may well be resolvable on the papers, because frankly, 
24 1 it's a contract issue and how the Court looks at that contract, 
25 And I'm really interested in the parties' analysis of the 
contractual obligations, the legal matters that have been 
raised I think rather well in briefs, and that's where I'm 
going to be focusing. 
And so let's get to the point where you feel like you 
need some time, Mr. Haskins, and we'll do our best to try to 
get it done today. If we can't, we won't be able to, but I'm 
going to invite — do the best we can with it. Let's start, 
then, with the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
I had a couple of questions, Counsel, as you're 
preparing your argument. One, would it be fair to say that 
Mr. Orlob never paid you for the amount that you paid the IRS 
for that contract? 
MR. THOMPSON: That's correct, your Honor, he did 
not. 
THE COURT: And is it also fair that in negotiating 
the contract that it was not disclosed that the IRS had this 
substantial lien, or potential — there's this debt, 
indebtedness? 
MR. THOMPSON: I believe that's correct, your Honor, 
but I can't speak — I can't say with certainty that that's 
correct. 
THE COURT: I have another question. This is a 
technical one. If it was an asset sale, which is what is being 
argued, what basis did the IRS have to come back against you 
for funds which, if all you're doing is buying assets, would 
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1 otherwise — the obligation would have been to Mr. Orlob, who 
2 had the corporation that had sold its assets, as opposed to the 
3 parties who bought the assets? 
4 MR. THOMPSON: Well, I'm an ex-IRS attorney, your 
5 J Honor, and I can't tell you the answer to that question. I'm 
6 presuming that Mr. Orlob, because he conducted business in the 
7 name of Professional's Control Group, and because 
8 Professional's Control Group incurred employment-tax 
9 liabilities which went unpaid, that that's why the IRS sought 
10 to seize the assets of Professional's Control Group to make 
11 those payments against those taxes. 
12 THE COURT: Even though the assets had been sold? 
13 MR. THOMPSON: Yes. Even though the assets had been 
14 sold, the apparent position of the Internal Revenue Service was 
15 that those assets had been replaced by this contract pursuant 
16 to which some payments were going to be made to Professional's 
17 Control Group via Mr. Orlob, and that is what they purported to 
18 seize, is my understanding. 
19 I THE COURT: All right. I guess what I'm looking to 
20 hear from your argument, it seems like your position is 
21 essentially this is an indivisible contract, and that the 
22 I failure of — in summary judgment, I mean there are all sorts of 
23 | issues that can be raised about whether or not Mr. Orlob 
24 performed his commitments, but the fundamental fact that you 
25 I had to buy it from the IRS after they seized the property is a 
1 I breach of some underlying obligation, and that excused you of 
2 any further obligation. Is that — 
3 I MR. THOMPSON: That's certainly exactly the 
4 ' position — let me just, if I may, your Honor — 
5 ' THE COURT: No. With that, I'm going to invite you 
6 I to make your argument. I'm trying to be sure I'm clear on 
7 [ where we're coming from, but I want you to argue your position, 
8 1 MR. THOMPSON: Way back in 1988, your Honor, 
9 | Mr. Orlob owned a business known as Professional's Control 
10 ! Group, which provided billing services to a number of 
11 anesthesiologists here in the Salt Lake City valley. Our 
12 I clients, Wasatch Medical Management, owned a similar such 
13 billing service in the Ogden area. 
14 And in attempting to expand their operations into a 
15 larger geographical area in Utah, our clients came in contact 
16 with Mr. Orlob, who, it transpired, was not interested in 
17 pursuing further business in the area of medical billing here 
18 J in Utah, and ultimately that resulted in the agreement, what 
19 has been referred to as the combined agreement, among the 
20 parties, pursuant to which Mr. Orlob purported to sell all of 
21 the assets of Professional's Control Group to our clients. 
22 Those assets included not only tangible assets — 
23 desks and furnishings and things — but also approximately 
24 I 20 contracts with physicians to perform billing services. Now, 
25 in that regard, Mr. Orlob had been charging his 
8 
anesthesiologists approximately six percent commission on the 
total amount of billings he performed. 
My clients had been charging their doctors 
approximately four percent in commissions and hoped to take 
over Mr. Orlob's business at the six percent rate that he was 
then using. And in fact, Mr. Orlob guaranteed that that would 
be the situation, that these people would all agree to this six 
percent figure. 
THE COURT: That's one of the express warranties in 
the contract, isn't it? 
MR. THOMPSON: It is, yes. 
He also agreed to ensure that a reasonable transition 
took place whereby he would contact these physicians and make a 
smooth transition from his operation to our clients' operation. 
It's our position that he did none of those things and thus 
breached the contract. 
Meanwhile, as your Honor knows, the Internal Revenue 
Service discovered some past-due taxes for Professional's 
Control Group, discovered the existence of this agreement after 
it had commenced and after some payments on it had been made, 
seized Professional's Control Group's portion of the agreement 
and sold it at a public auction, at which Mr. Orlob did not 
appear. 
Our clients did appear, purchased that half of the 
agreement, and thereafter presumed that they did not have any 
9 
further liabilities to Mr. Orlob. They then owned essentially 
both halves of the agreement. 
Now, meanwhile — 
THE COURT: What was the -
MR. THOMPSON: I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: What was the first half of the agreement 
they didn't purchase? I mean it was their part, you're saying. 
MR. THOMPSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: The other half was what you thought was 
the interest Professional's Group had in the agreement. 
MR. THOMPSON: Exactly. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. THOMPSON: Meanwhile, Mr. -
THE COURT: They paid something like $9,000 for it? 
That was the amount — 
MR. THOMPSON: I think that's - for the - under the -
at the IRS sale? 
THE COURT: Eight or nine thousand. 
MR. THOMPSON: I believe it was. 
THE COURT: Nine or ten thousand. 
MR. THOMPSON: Yes. I think that's correct. 
Meanwhile, Mr. Orlob, who had also agreed that he 
would not in any fashion compete with our clients, did in fact 
contact a doctor, Frank Peterson, in the Logan area, and 
arranged to do billing services for him. 
10 
1 THE COURT: Now, they're claiming that that didn't 
2 happen until after your guys stopped paying which happened 
3 after the IRS auction. Is that — are those undisputed facts? 
4 j MR. THOMPSON: Those are not undisputed facts, your 
5 Honor. My understanding is that the contact was made 
6 | relatively shortly after Mr. Orlob went to California. 
7 J In addition, your Honor, once Mr. Orlob got to 
8 California, he began to experience certain financial 
9 | difficulties and declared bankruptcy in the Southern District 
10 | of California, I believe. He did not declare in his bankruptcy 
11 j filings — I think those documents have already been filed with 
12 I the court in connection with the previous motion for summary 
13 ! judgment. He did not declare as an asset on his bankruptcy 
14 schedules any of the amounts he now says are due to him under 
15 j this agreement. 
16 i Now, it is true that the agreement specifies that it 
17 j binds the parties, both as corporate entities, Professional's 
18 I Control Group, or in our case a general partnership, Wasatch 
19 I Management, and as individuals. Everybody signs as 
20 ! individuals; they also sign as representatives of the corporate 
21 I entities. 
22 j But I would submit to you that that was done because 
! 
I 
23 ! corporations only act through their officers, and Mr. Orlob was 
24 | the only officer there was. He was also the only shareholder. 
25 | So when we speak of him acting in his individual capacity, 
11 
certainly it was important to bind him to the agreements he had 
made on behalf of Professional's Control Group. 
But we would urge the Court that that does not 
establish that he has any separately cognizable right to any 
payments under the agreement, particularly not after the 
Internal Revenue Service seized the payments due to him under 
that agreement. 
And that's essentially our argument, your Honor. I'm 
not going to go on and on about it because I know you're 
familiar with it, and this case has been up before on a motion 
for summary judgment, and I know you've familiarized yourself 
with these — with our submission. 
If you have any other questions I'll address those. 
Otherwise, I'll let the other side respond. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. BURNS: Good morning, your Honor. 
Well, your Honor, I'm hearing something slightly 
different from what I picked up through the briefs. I thought 
their position through their motion — you know, they didn't 
file a reply, so it would just be their memorandum in support — 
was that David Orlob had no interest in the combined agreement. 
So I'm hearing now that he had some interest, or he at least 
had obligations, a no-compete, et cetera. 
You know, we would suggest that they can't have it 
both ways. If the IRS sold something, it sold PCG's interest, 
12 
but whatever was left was David Orlob's, and that's what we're 
here about. The issue before the Court is did David Orlob have 
any interest in the combined agreement separate and apart from 
the corporation? 
THE COURT: Did he have any responsibility to accept 
the IRS financial indebtedness, or was he completely free of 
that? 
MR. BURNS: Well, the corporation had not done 
business since the agreement was executed in August of 1988, 
and it was dissolved for failure to file the yearly fee by the 
state of Utah in February of 1990. The IRS auction occurred in 
December of 1990. 
Essentially what happened is that he was — he did 
receive a letter from the defendants that this auction was to 
take place. Since it had always been his understanding that 
the corporation — the only part of the corporation's 
involvement in the contract was the transfer of the equipment 
which the corporation owned, and there was a past-due amount on 
the corporation, he just asked that the defendants take care of 
the matter, pay the IRS, and deduct from whatever they owed him 
whatever they happened to pay the IRS. 
So in response to your question, did he have any 
obligations, our position is no, he did not, because that was 
not an active corporation, but he was asking them to take care 
of any financial obligations that the IRS might say that the 
13 
1 ! corporation still had, and again, pay for it out of the moneys 
2 ! that they owed him. He was in California at the time, was 
3 j operating a new business which was unrelated to the 
4 | billing-and-collection business that he had. 
5 i Their position is, as I understand it, pretty much 
6 | that the Court should only focus on the introduction, which I 
i 
7 | think we can — hopefully we can all agree is not artfully 
8 I drafted, that at least there is an ambiguity as to who the 
i j 
9 ! parties are. 
10 I Now, I think we can refer to the ordinary rules of 
11 i construction which require us to construe a contract so that 
I 
12 j all the provisions are looked at, and consider the four corners 
13 I of the document, and interpret those provisions so that each 
14 I one of the parts of that document are harmonious. 
15 j We think that when the Court looks at that document 
16 in its entirety, what falls out is we have a corporation that 
17 is billing and collecting on behalf of anesthesiologists, but 
18 ! the value of that corporation is in the relationships between 
i 
19 j David Orlob personally and the doctors. So really what we had 
20 was the sale of relationships. 
21 Now, the contracts, I think it's important to point 
22 j out, allowed for any of these doctors to terminate the 
23 ; relationship with 90 days' notice. When David Orlob 
24 j represented, warranted through that combined agreement that the 
25 ! doctors were willing to pay six percent, that was a true and 
14 
correct statement when it was made in August of 1988. 
He had 20 contracts with 20 doctors. Each of those 
contracts provided for a six percent fee for total collections. 
It was true when it was stated. David Orlob did have a crystal 
ball, could not look in to the future and forecast what 
individual doctors might do when they were serviced by a new 
company. But he could represent, and he did accurately, that 
at the time the combined agreement was made, they were paying 
him six percent. 
THE COURT: So what you're saying is the intent of 
that language wasn't to, in effect, warrant that this is what 
these doctors would accept for payment, but only that this was 
how much he was getting from them at the time the contract was 
closed. That's what you are saying that that language should 
have been understood to mean. 
MR. BURNS: Yes, sir. And again, he could not have 
possibly made a representation that for the next six years of 
the contract these doctors would even be willing to be serviced 
by Wasatch. All that he could say was that he had contracts at 
that moment and that he would assist in the transfer of those 
files, and hopefully those clients would continue — were 
willing to be serviced by Wasatch. 
Now, I should point out — 
THE COURT: Well, if that's what he really meant, it 
sure would have been easier to say it in a different way than 
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1 I what he — 
2 j MR.. BURNS: Well -
3 | THE COURT: - said. He would have said, "I represent 
4 ! this is how much I've been receiving from these doctors as of 
5 the time of the closing," but that's apparently not — that's 
6 | not what that language says to me, as I read it. 
7 J MR. BURNS: Well, under the contract, David Orlob and 
8 I Wasatch were not going to get anything. They're wasn't going 
9 to be any exchange if these clients didn't stay on board. So 
10 David Orlob certainly had an incentive to — for these people to 
11 stay with Wasatch, and to ease that transition, and to help 
12 I them to stay serviced by Wasatch. Otherwise, he wasn't going 
13 I to get paid. 
14 Again, the value of the contracts were the 
15 I relationships he had. Now, there was an inherent risk to both 
16 j sides that these people would just vote with their feet, 
17 terminate the contracts and go somewhere else, and in fact — 
18 j THE COURT: But I think the contract accounted for 
19 j that. If they lost business, why, then that would reduce the 
2 0 amount that — 
21 MR. BURNS: It did. 
22 ! THE COURT: - your client would be paid, if I 
23 { understand it. 
24 I MR. BURNS: But that was the nature of the business: 
25 I there was inherent risk. All he could represent, though, was 
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1 I that he was being paid six percent at the time. He could not, 
2 again, forecast what these clients would do in the future. 
3 That would be an absurd obligation on his part, and it's in 
4 fact not what he did. 
5 You know, they've attached the contract to their 
6 moving papers, and that provides for six percent. And that's 
7 all that he was — and that's what the corporation was giving 
8 I them, and that's what he was representing. 
9 | It's an inherently competitive industry. They've 
10 I already told the Court that they were charging four percent. 
11 One of the reasons they wanted to get into these contracts is 
12 that he was charging six percent. But one of the problems is 
13 that Wasatch had solicited these same clients months before. 
14 One of the reasons they were willing to purchase the contracts 
15 and pay value for it is because these clients were not willing 
16 to come to them at four percent. 
17 But when Wasatch suddenly started servicing some of 
18 them, they said, "Well, you offered me four percent last month, 
19 and now you want me to pay six percent under the contract I had 
20 I with PCG." So then were some negotiations that took place. In 
21 fact, some of them went down to five percent, because otherwise 
22 they were going to terminate those contracts. 
23 Again, David Orlob couldn't possibly warrant what 
24 I these independent actors as agents were going to do with their 
25 j files, their contracts, in the future. All he could say is, 
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1 I "I've got a six percent guarantee right now, and that's what 
2 I I'm warrantying that I have and I'm being paid." He couldn't 
3 1 do anything about the future, though. 
4 j Now, their position again is we've got an 
5 ! introduction which refers to Orlob personally; it refers to 
6 i Professional's. It refers to the Jensens; it refers to 
7 | Wasatch. And then throughout the contract, collectively Orlob 
i 
8 J and PCG are referred to as Orlob. 
9 | If we look at the whole contract, though, again what 
10 j was transferred was the value of the good will, David Orlob's 
11 relationship with the doctors. That's the only value of these 
12 j contracts. 
13 j THE COURT: But he was acting through the 
14 corporation. 
15 MR. BURNS: He was, but once — the corporation, 
16 I without David Orlob, it didn't have any value, though. Again, 
17 I these contracts could be terminated in 90 days. Now, we 
18 | believe that these defendants interpreted the contract the same 
19 way we're suggesting. 
20 I I pulled the case EIE versus St. Benedict's. The 
21 Supreme Court of Utah held that a contract, the intent of the 
22 parties will be - is a matter of the parties' conduct after 
23 | that contract. In other words, in this case the contract said, 
24 "We will pay you $90 for delivering patients to our hospital 
25 j via paramedics." Throughout the duration of that contract, the 
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1 I hospital, in fact, paid 90 percent of whatever the value of 
2 that delivery was. 
3 | The court held that the conduct of the parties, even 
4 I if the contract appeared to be clear on its face, "We're going 
5 to enforce what the parties clearly intended through their 
6 conduct." We think that their conduct clearly demonstrates 
7 that they interpreted that contract to mean that David Orlob 
8 was owed obligations and was to be paid these commissions 
9 j personally. 
10 They only paid personal checks - checks made out to 
11 j David Orlob personally. It's undisputed. It's undisputed that 
12 the corporation ceased to do business after August of 1988. 
13 | It's undisputed that the corporation was dissolved in February 
14 of 1990, and it's undisputed that they continued to pay David 
15 Orlob personally. They paid him 1099rs personally, and they 
16 continued to do that. They only stopped making payments when 
17 at the IRS auction, when apparently they saw an opportunity to 
18 extinguish what they thought were their obligations to David 
19 j Orlob. 
20 I Again, what I'm hearing is that David Orlob had 
21 obligations through that contract, but they want it both ways. 
22 I Then they say, on the other hand, "We didn't owe him anything 
23 through that contract." Clearly there was a no-compete clause 
24 j there. It was actually four years longer than the agreement 
25 itself. He was obligated to not compete in the state of Utah 
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1 with Wasatch for ten years instead of the contract duration of 
2 six years. Clearly there was consideration that was owed to 
3 him through that contract for that agreement. 
i 
4 | Now, with respect to the two allegations that he 
5 breached the agreement, that no-compete agreement. Their 
6 j motion was submitted prior to taking the deposition of — I 
7 j honestly can't recall her name, but — 
8 j MR. SCOFIELD: Tracey Karsone. 
9 j MR. BURNS: Formerly Tracey Hall, and I can't 
10 j pronounce the last name. She's remarried. 
11 I She was deposed in October, in fact after we 
12 ! responded. Again, they didn't file a reply. Ms. Hall 
13 j testified that Dr. Peterson — she had been servicing 
14 Dr. Peterson at PCG. He approached her after the contract, the 
15 I combined agreement, was executed, and asked her to continue to 
16 I handle her account. She did so after she moved to California 
17 j to work for Mr. Orlob's company, which again had nothing to do 
18 I with the servicing of anesthesiologists or doctors; it had to 
19 do with electronic transmittals of insurance claims. 
20 She testified that he approached her. She worked on 
21 J his accounts after hours. She's billed Dr. Peterson on her 
22 letterhead, and the money went to her. David Orlob had nothing 
23 ] to do with it. 
24 Now, they should have mentioned that to the Court; 
25 | they didn't. That, to our — and they haven't — obviously, they 
20 
haven't taken any subsequent depositions, so I don't know — I'm 
not aware of any way that they could refute that testimony. 
THE COURT: Counsel, let me just direct you to where 
I think this — this is a hearing on summary judgment. It seems 
to me, if I have to get into issues about Tracey Hall, we have 
the fact that she's in the trial and there's a dispute between 
the parties. Even to the extent that intent is somehow 
disclosed by the parties' conduct under the contract, my 
understanding of contract law is somewhat different than that. 
My understanding is that what you do is you, first of 
all, start with the four corners of the document, and to the 
extent that you can discern intent from that, then that becomes 
a basis upon which the court can rule. And it seems to me, 
where I'm really looking at is to decide whether what the 
parties intended when they contracted, and under the terms of 
that combined agreement, was to maintain, in effect, severable 
and independent relationships between the defendants and the 
corporation and — I think they said — the sole shareholder. 
And that's what I'm really interested in. Now, if I 
understand your argument, you're saying because he had ongoing 
obligations not to compete that that establishes that there was 
an intent to have separate, independent relationships. Whether 
or not that's true, that's really where I think you've got to 
focus your argument and where I'm going to ask in response to 
it, because I think that's the basis upon I have to rule in 
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looking at a summary judgment on this issue. 
It's what exactly the parties intended and what the 
sense of that contract was, as it was entered into, and then 
what the IRS managed to execute on down the road somewhere that 
was purchased separately by the defendants. 
MR. BURNS: Okay, your Honor. Then our position is 
that David Orlob was a party to that contract personally, 
separate and apart from PCG, and that exists by virtue of the 
no-compete clause and by virtue of the good will that he 
personally had established. 
Now, was that the property of the corporation? The 
obligation — the contract is clear that David Orlob was 
required to do certain things after the contract was signed. 
Now, at the moment — all that the contract transfer was 
equipment and the contracts, which again were terminable with 
90 days' notice. 
David Orlob was obligated for the duration of that 
six-year contract to assist Wasatch in continuing that 
relationship,. Those were independent obligations, yet all that 
the corporation had were the contracts, the paper documents, 
which didn't mean anything. The value was essentially 
worthless by virtue of the nature of the service provided, and 
the equipment was transferred. 
The corporation ceased to do business. They didn't 
pay the corporation. They clearly thought that they were 
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dealing with David Orlob and that David Orlob had obligations 
that were personal in maintaining those relationships, 
THE COURT: Well, if they bought the assets, wouldn't 
the responsibility to keep the corporation active be your 
client's responsibility? 
MR. BURNS: Well, your Honor, my client believed that 
the corporation ceased to do business, ceased when the contract 
was formed, that once the equipment was transferred, the 
corporation didn't have any reason to exist any longer, that he 
was being asked - and we think the language in the agreement is 
specific: David Orlob shall do this; David Orlob shall do this. 
"Orlob warrants he will assist in the 
orderly transfer of all accounts to Jensens 
and assist Jensens to maintain the account 
over the life of this agreement." 
THE COURT: Well, now, when you say that, though, 
don't they define Orlob as a corporation and David Orlob? In 
other words, when you say that, it has to be taken into account 
that the contract itself says Orlob is the corporation and 
David Orlob. So it doesn't really support your argument any 
more than it supports theirs, if you're trying to find from 
that language — 
MR. BURNS: Well -
THE COURT: - that particular meaning. 
MR. BURNS: And again, I would advert to just the 
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rules of construction. If the document is looked at in its 
entirety, the four corners, and we're just focusing on the 
black-and-white words that are there, the introduction is — 
includes both David Orlob and the corporation. 
Again, I don't think it was artfully drafted. But 
the substance of that agreement we think establishes certain 
obligations that are personal for David Orlob, and therefore 
certain considerations that should have — that flowed to him 
from Wasatch and from the Jensens. 
The corporation was not guaranteeing. You know, if 
there was a problem, then these defendants should have raised 
it: "You're not operating this corporation." They never paid 
the corporation. They clearly believed that they were — that 
David Orlob was the person who owed them these obligations. 
They never raised any issue for the two years that they were 
performing on this contract. 
Again, I think their conduct before and after the IRS 
auction — excuse me — before and after PCG was dissolved, 
indicates that they believed that it was David Orlob that they 
had contracted with or David Orlob that had these obligations 
to assist them in these things. 
"David Orlob warrants he will not compete 
directly or indirectly in Utah." 
These are the two main warranties other than the six 
percent of total collections we've referred to that were — that 
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are specific to David Orlob, and I think that's come out of 
their argument- They're not referring to "PCG owed us these" 
or nPCG warranted." It's David Orlob who warranted that these 
certain things would happen. 
Now, for that to be an enforceable warranty under the 
agreement, there would have to be consideration flowing to 
David Orlob through this agreement as well. 
THE COURT: How can that - are you saying that a 
corporation, the sole shareholder of a corporation, couldn't 
bind the shareholder under a contract without having individual 
covenants to the person who was the shareholder and the only 
officer of the company? 
MR. BURNS: Well, certainly the -
THE COURT: Where's the law on that? 
MR. BURNS: Certainly he could if he were acting in 
his corporate capacity at that moment, but we believe that he 
was in fact — he was warranting his personal involvement. 
THE COURT: But of course that begs the question. 
That's the whole the issue here, isn't it, Counsel, 
realistically? I mean whatever way you look at it, is he 
acting in a corporate capacity, or was he really making a 
contract that was separate and independent and severable? I 
mean to me that's the whole issue here, but it begs the 
question to say if it was one way because that's what you — one 
has to decide from looking at that contrast• 
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MR- BURNS: Well, you know, if we just focus on the 
no-compete clause, I would submit that that clearly applies to 
David Orlob personally. That is not "PCG shall not compete for 
ten years with Wasatch." That is Orlob, and that could only 
apply to David Orlob. 
And by virtue of the nature of that business, I've 
got to believe that the defendants would have been foolish to 
just contract with PCG. David Orlob then could have just 
walked right out the door, as an enforceable agreement, and 
then set up shop, another corporation or a sole proprietorship 
in his own name, and started soliciting those same clients, and 
they would have a worthless contract on their hands. 
Clearly, there was some obligation directed at David 
Orlob, not in his corporate capacity but in his personal 
capacity, that "you can't compete with us for ten years." And 
there was — there had to be consideration flowing to him for 
that, because again, by virtue of the nature of the business, 
that's all that the business really has, is the relationship. 
These folks can go out and get — and contract with 
anybody they want to, purchase pretty much the same service. 
It's the trust that David Orlob develops over time, having set 
up this business in 1978 and having worked on it for 12 years — 
or excuse me — it would have been ten years before the contract 
was signed. It was his trust, the personal trust they had in 
him, that they — the reason that's why they stayed with him. 
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THE COURT: To pick up on your argument that the 
intent of the parties, in entering into a contract, is 
disclosed by their actions after, why didn't your client list 
in his bankruptcy the asset that he thought he still had in 
this? 
MR. BURNS: And I have to confess that I don't know 
the answer to that question, and having just been brought into 
this case recently, I honestly haven't discussed it with my 
client. Perhaps Mr. Scofield - well, actually, I don't think 
Mr. Scofield knows either. So I'm honestly not sure, your 
Honor. 
If I might bring this case to the Court's attention. 
This is the St. Benedict's case. It's on the last page. The 
language that I'm referring to. It begins with: 
"Finally, the course of dealing of the 
parties gives some indication of their 
intentions." 
And then the last sentence in that paragraph: 
"Though arguably clear on its face" — 
referring to the contract — 
— "where the parties demonstrate by 
their actions that to them the contract meant 
something quite different, the intent of the 
parties will be enforced." 
Which I think just stands for the simple proposition 
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that the best indicator of the parties' intent, what they 
really believed that contract to mean, is how they conducted 
themselves after the contract. 
THE COURT: And the point you're making is they wrote 
the check to Mr. Orlob rather than — 
MR. BURNS: They wrote every check to Mr. Orlob. And 
the dissolution of the corporation didn't have any effect on 
their continued payments to Mr. Orlob personally, and their 
payments — their transmittal of a 1099 to Mr. Orlob personally. 
Everything they did, they did to David Orlob personally. 
Nothing was with PCG. PCG was in that office and then just 
essentially went away. So it's our belief that these 
defendants believed that they were — their obligations were 
owed to David Orlob personally. 
Just referring to the rules of construction, I would 
submit that we at least have an ambiguous contract. If we have 
an ambiguous contract, we can refer to extrinsic evidence 
outside the contract, and therefore we would be able to refer 
to the parties' conduct. That introduction, given the 
subsequent substance of the agreement, just is not clear and 
unambiguous and capable of interpretation just within the four 
corners of the document. 
We still have to refer to the other rules of 
construction which require a harmonious interpretation, 
et cetera. We're referring — I think under the circumstances, 
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1 the Court is authorized to refer to extrinsic evidence. 
2 THE COURT: And the extrinsic evidence is simply the 
3 fact that they made personal checks out to Mr. Orlob. That's 
4 I what you're — that's right. 
5 MR. BURNS: Yes, your Honor. But - well, all the -
6 THE COURT: I mean that it seemed like it's 
7 undisputed that, one, the checks that were made after the 
8 contract was closed were to Mr. Orlob, not to the corporation; 
9 and secondly, it seemed to be undisputed that Mr. Orlob didn't 
10 list as an asset in his bankruptcy his interest in this 
11 corporation. So those are two undisputed facts that are — that 
12 one can treat as extrinsic in interpreting the contract. Is 
13 I that reasonable? 
14 I MR. BURNS: That would be our position, your Honor. 
15 Again, if the Court believes that the contract is unambiguous 
16 I on its face, and I would submit that it is not, although — 
17 THE COURT: Of course you're asking me for summary 
18 judgment on your side of it too, so at least to the extent that 
19 ! whatever facts are material in determining the meaning, they're 
20 undisputed, so I do have a basis upon which I can rule, it 
21 seems, from both sides. 
22 MR. BURNS: And those extrinsic facts are undisputed. 
23 J If I might refer to our motion for summary judgment 
24 J on plaintiffs' claim. They did not submit a single solitary 
25 I fact in opposition to that. They didn't even incorporate by 
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1 reference their arguments in their motion for summary judgment. 
2 THE COURT: Well, let me take up that if I need to 
3 j get to it after I — 
4 MR. BURNS 
5 | THE COURT 
6 MR. BURNS 
Okay. 
— hear other arguments in response. 
Thank you. 
7 | MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, let me first just point 
out that the consideration for the combined agreement 
9 ! essentially was represented by the moneys flowing to my clients 
10 and on to Mr. Orlob as a result of the combined agreement from 
11 these various anesthesiologists who were making payments. All 
12 of the contracts, every one of them, is between Professional's 
13 Control Group and the anesthesiologists, not Mr. Orlob and the 
14 I anesthesiologists. 
15 Further, although the Internal Revenue Service levy 
16 on the combined agreement, in the hope that it could then get 
17 all of these moneys paid over to it to satisfy these tax 
18 I liabilities, the IRS could easily have simply gone to each 
19 i individual doctor and said, "We're levying on these payments 
20 I from you. Don't give these moneys to the Jensens or to Wasatch 
21 Management." 
22 Had they done that, we wouldn't even be here. The 
23 j only difficulty is that the IRS chose to levy on the combined 
24 | agreement itself from the Jensens, not from the doctors 
25 themselves. And once that happened, the Jensens purchased the 
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1 right of the IRS to make that levy from the Internal Revenue 
2 Service. It seems to me that's basically the end of the case. 
3 It's as simple as that. 
4 I To answer one of Mr. Burns's earlier questions, we 
5 don't agree that the value of the contracts was in Mr. Orlob's 
6 good will with the doctors, and if the case goes to trial, 
7 there will be plenty of evidence to demonstrate that there was 
8 no good will from Mr. Orlob in connection with these 
9 anesthesiologists. 
10 Two of them terminated services with my clients 
11 precisely because they couldn't stand Mr. Orlob. A third 
12 doctor, when he came to the headquarters of the company to 
13 J address issues regarding the transition, Mr. Orlob left through 
14 the back door, wouldn't even address the doctor and the 
15 transition that was to take place. 
16 I THE COURT: Of course those are disputed facts, and 
17 I they certainly would raise there on the side of the trial, and 
18 j I can't even look at that -
19 MR. THOMPSON: That's true. 
2 0 THE COURT: - at this point. 
21 MR. THOMPSON: But the key thing is that the 
22 contracts themselves, all of the contracts that generated 
23 j income, were in the name Professional's Control Group and not 
24 | Mr. Orlob, and that's why the levy on those contracts occurred. 
25 j Had the levies occurred one step removed, at the doctors 
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themselves, and the Jensens got no money because the IRS levied 
on those contracts, we wouldn't even be here. There would be 
no lawsuit. It's only because the Jensens purchased that 
interest that somehow Mr. Orlob is now willing to say he gets a 
portion or — some portion or all of that. 
The other point I wanted to make was the comment of 
Mr. Burns that some other person — Tracey Kartsone I think is 
her name now — actually serviced the Dr. Peterson contract. In 
fact, Tracey Kartsone was Mr. Orlob's girlfriend; they lived 
together in California. And both she — well, I don't know 
about she — but Mr. Orlob bragged to employees of my clients 
that weren't my clients going to be surprised when they 
discovered that he had taken Dr. Peterson from them. And if 
the case goes to trial, we'll bring that witness out and have 
her testify to that. 
I think other than those comments, I've covered 
everything I want to cover, unless the Court has some further 
question. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. BURNS: Your Honor, if I might supplement my 
answer with respect to the bankruptcy issue. Apparently 
Mr. Orlob filed his personal bankruptcy after they had 
terminated payments at the time of the IRS auction in December. 
So he filed bankruptcy - he doesn't recall the specific year -
but no earlier than 1991, more likely in 1992. 
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So we would submit that that fact is not relevant to 
this — to the Court's determination, and not relevant to the 
St. Benedict's case either which deals with the course of 
conduct between the parties. That bankruptcy issue, it had 
nothing to do with the ongoing relationship or interaction 
between parties. Thank you very much. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
The Court's prepared to rule at this time on this 
matter. It's the Court's position that the intent of this 
contract, as manifest from the four corners of the document, is 
that there were not severable, independent relationships 
established from the defendants to the plaintiff; that 
Mr. Orlob is indistinguishable from the Professional's Control 
Group, Inc.; that in fact the contract, as the preamble states, 
collectively referring to Professional's Group and its 
principal shareholder David L. Orlob as Orlob, is indicative 
and consistent with the remainder of the contract as the Court 
views it; that the obligations to the plaintiff in this case 
were those obligations to the corporation and the shareholder 
acting through that corporation. 
I'm going to grant summary judgment. It's my view 
that the IRS's action in effect terminated the relationship 
that Mr. Orlob had, that the obligations that the defendant's 
had to Mr. Orlob because the interests that existed were 
interests that were taken over by the IRS in appropriating the 
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1 part of the corporation owed to the plaintiff in the case, and 
2 that the payment of that in the public auction by the 
3 I defendants extinguished any obligation they had to Mr. Orlob. 
4 I'm going to ask counsel for the defendants to 
5 | prepare findings and conclusions, and I would like you to fully 
6 J outline the arguments that you've made because I think that 
7 | they all are fair reflections of the intent of the parties as I 
think they exist in this agreement. And based on that, I'm 
9 I going to terminate — I'm ruling in favor of the defendants, and 
10 I think that concludes this issue. Thank you, counsel. 
11 And that would be the end of this case, subject to 
12 your appellate rights, I believe. 
13 MR. BURNS: Well, actually, your Honor, defendants 
14 have a counterclaim on which we have moved for summary 
15 judgment. 
16 MR. HASKINS: Your Honor, based on your finding, we 
17 would dismiss our counterclaim, assuming if it is appealed, 
18 that we would be able to address those counterclaim issues if 
19 I they were to prevail on appeal. 
20 The only other issue is the contract provides for 
21 j attorneys fees, and we would move for attorneys fees as well. 
22 I know that recent case law says that can be addressed at a 
23 | later date based upon an affidavit filed. 
24 J THE COURT: It seems to me that the issue of 
25 attorneys fees is a separate issue that needs to be addressed. 
34 
1 It isn't automatic in my mind that attorneys fees would arise 
2 from what happened in this case, because I think it could be 
3 argued that there wasn't a default, but rather just that the 
4 contractual relationships that had been established were 
5 terminated by the action of the IRS, 
6 And I'm not ruling on that, but I'm just suggesting 
7 J that I'm not prepared to move from ruling in your favor to a 
conclusion that you're entitled to attorneys fees. I would 
9 I allow the plaintiffs to address that issue, 
10 MR. BURNS: And we also submit that, since we don't 
11 J represent the corporation, we would not be the proper party to 
12 [unintelligible] attorneys fees [unintelligible]. 
13 THE COURT: Well, whatever the - I'd suggest, 
14 counsel, that the issue of attorneys fees be addressed, and 
15 I then we'll invite a response from the plaintiff in the case. 
16 Then we'll be able to proceed to decide whether it's an 
17 appropriate claim and, if so, against whom. 
18 MR. BURNS: Very well. 
19 MR. HASKINS: Thank you, your Honor, 
20 THE COURT: We'll be in recess, 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID L. ORLOB, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
WASATCH MANAGEMENT, KENNETH 
C. JENSEN, EARLENE B. JENSEN, 
STEVEN K. JENSEN, and KEVIN J. 
JENSEN, 
Defendants. 
FINAL JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 
RULE 54(b) 
Civil No. 910901061CV 
Judge William B. Bohling 
On October 23, 2000, a hearing came on regularly before the Court for 
consideration of (1) Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum to Amend Order and to Enter a 
Final Judgment, and (2) Defendants' Motion for Order Allowing Costs and Attorney Fees. 
The Plaintiff, David L. Orlob, was represented by and through his counsel of record, David 
J. Burns; Defendants Wasatch Medical Management, Kenneth C. Jensen, Earlene B. 
By 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Dap'jiy Clerk 
Jensen, Steven K. Jensen, and Kevin J. Jensen were represented by and through their 
counsel of record, James C. Haskins and Thomas N. Thompson. Subsequent to the 
hearing, Plaintiff submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law certifying 
Plaintiffs claims for appeal under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), and the parties submitted a 
Stipulation, Motion and Order Withdrawing Counterclaim. The Court has considered the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as well as the stipulation and motion 
of the parties, and has entered the same as orders in this action, and incorporates the 
same by reference as if fully set forth herein. Thus, having considered the written 
submissions of the parties, heard oral arguments of counsel, and for the reasons set forth 
in the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law certifying Plaintiffs claims for 
appeal under Rule 54(b), 
IT IS ORDERED that: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Order Allowing Costs and Attorney Fees is hereby 
DENIED due to the lack of a statutory or contractual right to the same; 
2. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Order and to Enter a Final Judgment is hereby 
GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiffs claims are certified for appeal under Utah R. Civ. 
P. 54(b), for the reasons set forth in the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; 
and 
3. Final judgment is hereby entered as to all of the claims of Plaintiff against 
Defendants as more fully set forth in the Amended Complaint herein. 
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DONE this 1$ day of _ /OCV- , 2000. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES 
BY THE COURT 
6( uSvb 
WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
Third District Judge 
JAMES C. HASKINS 
)MAS N. TNQMHSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
50556 01 
F \DATA\djb\Files\ORLOB\P\Final JudgBment-Rule54(b) wpd 
TabD 
i 
Prepared and Submitted by: 
DAVID W. SCOFIELD - 4140 
DAVID J. BURNS-7157 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-4300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
•••'viiii District 
W 0 6 2B0B 
i y ^T LAKE COUNTY 
w
«v^iy C.%?fc 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID L. ORLOB, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
WASATCH MANAGEMENT, KENNETH 
C. JENSEN, EARLENE B. JENSEN, 
STEVEN K. JENSEN, and KEVIN J. 
JENSEN, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CERTIFYING 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR APPEAL 
UNDER RULE 54(b) 
Civil No. 910901061CV 
Judge William B. Bohling 
On October 23, 2000, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Order and to Enter a Final 
Judgment, and Defendants' Motion for Order Allowing Costs and Attorney Fees, came 
on for hearing, the Plaintiff appearing by and through his counsel of record, David J. 
Burns, and Defendants appearing by and through their counsel of record, James C. 
Haskins and Thomas N. Thompson, and the Court, having heard argument with respect 
to the foregoing motions, and being fully advised in the premises therefor, hereby enters 
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On May 31,2000, the Court entered an order on the parties' cross-motions 
for summary judgment on Plaintiffs claims against Defendants as more fully set forth in 
the Amended Complaint herein. Specifically, the Court granted Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and denied Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiffs Claims. 
2. At the oral argument on the foregoing cross-motions, on March 6, 2000, 
Defendants' counsel represented to the Court that Defendants would dismiss their 
Counterclaim, "assuming if it [the Court's ruling granting summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants] is appealed, that we [Defendants] would be able to address those 
counterclaim issues if they [Plaintiff] were to prevail on appeal." 
3. On or about June 30, 2000, Plaintiff submitted a Motion to Amend Order 
and to Enter a Final Judgment. On or about July 5,2000, Defendants submitted a Motion 
for Order Allowing Costs and Attorney Fees in connection with the entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants. 
4. Oral argument on the foregoing motions was heard before the Court on 
October 23, 2000, and, ruling from the bench, the Court granted Plaintiffs request to 
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certify for appeal the entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and denied 
Defendants' request for an award of costs and attorney fees. 
5. Defendants subsequently stipulated in writing to the withdrawal of their 
Counterclaim pending Plaintiffs appeal of the Court's entry of summary judgment in favor 
of Defendants. The stipulation provides that the Counterclaim is withdrawn pending 
Plaintiffs appeal of the summary judgment order, subject, however, to the right of 
Defendants to renew their Counterclaim in the event that Plaintiff were to prevail on 
appeal. The parties have further stipulated that if Plaintiff were to not prevail on appeal, 
then after the action is remanded to the trial court for consideration of the Counterclaim, 
Defendants will immediately submit the appropriate motion to dismiss their Counterclaim, 
with prejudice. 
6. Following the entry of the Court's Order dated May 31, 2000 granting 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants in connection with Plaintiffs claims, and the 
order filed concurrently herewith denying Defendants' Motion Allowing Costs and Attorney 
Fees, all claims raised in the Amended Complaint against all Defendants have been 
disposed of by order of the Court. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the entry of a final 
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties in an action, and 
provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
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Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple 
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in 
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or 
third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, 
the Court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one 
or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon 
an express determination by the Court that there is no just 
reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry 
of judgment . . . . 
2. In his Motion to Amend Order and to Enter a Final Judgment, Plaintiff has 
requested that the Court certify his claims as set forth in the Amended Complaint for 
appeal under Rule 54(b). 
3. The Court finds that the requirements of Rule 54(b) are satisfied here, and 
Plaintiffs claims against Defendants should be certified for appeal as a final judgment. 
Specifically, more than one claim for relief is presented in this action, both as a claim and 
counterclaim, and multiple parties are involved. The Court further finds that as a result 
of the entry of the Court's Order dated May 31, 2000, and the Order denying Defendants' 
Motion Allowing Costs and Attorney Fees, the Court has fully determined all of Plaintiffs 
claims as set forth in the Amended Complaint against all Defendants in this action. 
4. The Court expressly finds that there is no just reason for delay and has 
directed that a final judgment be entered as to Plaintiffs claims against Defendants. The 
parties have expressed their desire to obtain appellate review of the Court's determination 
of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on Plaintiffs claims. This Court sees 
no reason why that review should be delayed, especially since Defendants have 
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withdrawn their Counterclaim pending appeal of the entry of summary judgment in their 
favor. 
5. Having determined that the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) are 
satisfied in this instance, the Court finds that the entry of a final judgment on Plaintiffs 
claims is warranted. 
DONE this (o day of A M - 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES 
15 
WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
Third District Judge 
I 
JAMES C. HA$KINS 
10MAS N. THOMPSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDrCIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID L. ORLOB, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
WASATCH MANAGEMENT, KENNETH 
C. JENSEN, EARLENE B. JENSEN, 
STEVEN K. JENSEN, and KEVIN J. 
JENSEN, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION, MOTION AND ORDER 
WITHDRAWING COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 910901061CV 
Judge William B. Bohling 
STIPULATION AND MOTION 
The parties, Plaintiff David L. Orlob, on the one hand, and Defendants, Wasatch 
Medical Management, Kenneth C. Jensen, Earlene B. Jensen, Steven K. Jensen, and 
Kevin J. Jensen, on the other hand, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby 
stipulate and agree that, pursuant to Defendants' counsel's representation at the hearing 
before Judge William B. Bohling on March 6,2000, the Counterclaim in this action should 
\ «•- I W 1, ivu 
N3V 0 6 2000 
By Dsp-iy Cisrk 
be withdrawn, subject, however, to the right of Defendants to renew their Counterclaim 
in the event that Plaintiff were to prevail on appeal. The parties further stipulate that in 
the event Plaintiff were to not prevail on appeal, then after the action is remanded to the 
trial court for consideration of the Counterclaim, Defendants will immediately submit the 
appropriate motion to dismiss the Counterclaim, with prejudice. 
DATED this _2$ day of 6c~h> &^r , 2000. 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
^ d a v o f 6 d DATED this OJZ 
. day of 
DAVID J. BURNS 
Attorneys Plaintiff 
, 2000. 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES 
KAMES C. HASKIIUS 
iOMAS N. THOMPSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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ORDER 
Having considered the Stipulation and Motion of the parties, and good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Counterclaim herein is withdrawn, subject, 
however, to the right of Defendants to renew their Counterclaim in the event that Plaintiff 
were to prevail on appeal of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs 
claims. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event that Plaintiff were to not prevail on 
appeal of the same, then after the action is remanded to the trial court for consideration 
of the Counterclaim, Defendants shall immediately submit the appropriate motion to 
dismiss their Counterclaim, with prejudice. 
DONE this 3 day of ^ J 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
Third District Judge 
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James C. Haskins (#1406) 
Thomas N. Thompson (#3243) 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2827 
Telephone: (801)539-0234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID L. ORLOB, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WASATCH MEDICAL MANAGEMENT, 
a Utah general partnership 
KENNETH C. JENSEN, individually 
and as general partner of Wasatch 
Medical Management, EARLENE B. 
JENSEN, individually and as 
general partner of Wasatch 
Medical Management, STEVEN 
K. JENSEN, individually and 
as general partner of Wasatch 
Medical Management, and 
KEVEN J. JENSEN, individually 
and as general partner of 
Wasatch Medical Management, 
ORDER 
Civil No. 910901061CN 
Judge William B. Bohling 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Th ;"i Judicial District 





The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment in the above entitled case 
having come on for hearing on March 6, 2000, the Plaintiffs appearing by their 
attorneys David W. Scofield and David J. Burns, and the Defendants appearing by their 
attorneys James C. Haskins and Thomas N. Thompson, and the Court, having heard 
argument with respect to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and for the 
reasons set forth in the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
contemporaneously entered herein, it is 
ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in the 
above-entitled case is hereby GRANTED. It is further 
ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's 
Claims in the above-entitled case is hereby DENIED. 
DATED this 2£) day of May, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
WILLIAM B. BOHLING _ 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
David J. Burns 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
357 Soiitn 203 East Suns 303 
Salt La«e City, U:an 8^' 1 "-2327 
Telephone (301)539-023^ 
5N THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT O? SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID L ORL03, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs 
WASATCH MEDICAL MANAGEMENT, 
a Utan genera! partnership 
KENNETH C JENSEN, individually 
and as general partner oi Wasatch 
Medical Management, EARLENE B 
JENSEN, individually and as 
general partner of Wasatch 
Medical Management, STEVEN 
K JENSEN, individually and 
as general partner of Wasatch 
Medical Management, and 
KEVEN J JENSEN, individually 
and as general partner of 
Wasatch Medical Management, 
Civil No 910901061CN 
Judge William 3. 3ohiing 
Defendants. 
i he parties' cross-motions for summary iudgrnent in the above entitled case 
having come on for hearing on March 5, 2030, ine Plaintiffs appearing by tneir 
attorneys David W. Scofieid and David J. Burns, and the Defendants appearing by their 
attorneys James C. Hassans and Thomas N. Thompson, and the Court, having heard 
argument with respect to Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Court 
being fully advised, hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. in 1938, Plaintiff Orlob was the sole shareholder and President of 
Physician's Control Group, inc. (hereinafter "PCG"), a Utah corporation performing 
billing services on behalf of physicians primarily located in the Salt Lake City, Utah, 
metropolitan area. 
2. Also during 1933, the individual Defendants were partners in a Utah 
general partnership known as Wasatch Medical Management, which performed billing 
services on behalf of physicians primarily located in the Ogden, Utah, metropolitan 
area. 
3. On August 31, 1988, the parties entered into a contract (the "Combined 
Agreement") for the purchase by Defendants of all of the assets of PCG. The 
Combined Agreement identified the parties as follows: 
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This agreement is made between two groups; namely: PROFESSIONAL'S 
CONTROL GROUP, !NC.: its principal shareholder David L. Oriob, 
hereinafter collectiveiy referred 10 as "Oriob/ and WASATCH MEDICAL 
MANAGEMENT. A PARTNERSHIP, whose principal oartners are Kenneth 
C. Jensen, Eariene 3. Jensen, Steven K. Jensen and Keven J. Jensen, 
hereinafter collectively referred to as "Jensens." 
4. The Combined Agreement, effective as of August 1, 19S8, provided for 
the transfer to the Defendants of ail of the physical assets of PCG as well as the 
transfer of ail of the contracts between PCG and the physicians for whom PCG formerly 
provided billing services. These transfers represented ail of the assets of PCG. The 
stock of PCG was not purchased, and remained in the hands of Plaintiff Oriob. 
5. In consideration for the transfer of the physical assets of PCG to the 
Defendants, the Combined Agreement provided for payment to PCG and Plaintiff Oriob, 
collectively, of $15,000.00, payable $7,500.00 on or before September 25, 1938, and 
$7,500.00 on or before October 25, 1988. 
6. In consideration for the transfer of the contracts between PCG and the 
physicians for whom PCG formerly provided billing services, the Combined Agreement 
provided for payments of commissions to PCG and Plaintiff Oriob, collectively, of 
certain monthly commissions, the amount of which varied depending on the number of 
physicians who retained Defendants' services and other factors. The commission 
period commenced October 1, 1988 and was to terminate on July 31, 1994. 
7. The Combined Agreement also provided that Oriob and PCG collectively 
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warrantee that they would assist sn the orderiv transfer of all accounts 10 the 
Defendants and assist them in maintaining the accounts over tne life of the Combined 
Agreement. 
S Tne Combined Agreement also provided that Orlob and PC3, collectively, 
would not compete directly or indirectly in Utan against or adverse to the Defendants in 
the billing and coi Section service for a period often years commencing August 1, 1938. 
9. The Combined Agreement also provided that Orlob and PCG warranted, 
collectively, that all listed anesthesiologists' accounts "must be willing to pay 6% of 
total collections for services rendered." 
10. Following execution by the parties of the Combined Agreement, Plaintiff 
Orlob did not conduct any further business on behalf of PCG; nor did he file any further 
annual reports with the Secretary of State. In or about February, 1990, PCG was 
involuntarily dissolved by the Staie of Utah for failure to file its annual report. 
11. Plaintiff Oriob moved to Los Angeles, California, in or about October, 
1939. 
12. At some point in 1990, Defendants were contacted by telephone by 
representatives of the internal Revenue Service seeking the whereabouts of Plaintiff 
Orlob with respect to past due taxes owed by PCG. On October 5, 1990, Defendant 
Kenneth C Jensen wrote to Plaintiff Orlob, advising him that the IRS had "been trying 
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TO get with you for 3Li::e some rime now " that ine Defendants were iegaliy bound to oay 
amounts cue under the Combine:, Agreement 10 ihe IRS' and that ine SR3 had toe 
power 10 "seize and sell" PCG's interest in the Combined Agreement to get past due 
taxes owed by PCG paid immediately. 
13. The IRS served a notice of levy on the Defendants with respect to the 
payments due from the physicians under the Combined Agreement and, commencing 
October 19, 1990, payments otherwise due to be paid by the Defendants under the 
Combined Agreement were paid over to the iRS instead. None of the amounts paid 
over to the iRS were ever reimbursed to the Defendants by Plaintiff Orlob. 
14. Subsequently, the IRS seized the payments due under the Combined 
Agreement and sold the "right, title, and interest1' of PCG in the Combined Agreement 
at a pubiic sale heid on December 10, 1990. The Defendants purchased the "right, 
title, and interest" of PCG at that sale for $9,406 31. None of the amounts paid over to 
the IRS in connection with that sale were ever reimbursed to the Defendants by Plaintiff 
Oriob. 
CONCLUSIONS Or LAW 
1. Pursuant to the terms of the Combined Agreement, references to "Orlob" 
refer to him not simply as an individual separate and apart from PCG, but refer to him 
oniy in his capacity as the President and principal shareholder of PCG. 
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2. A corporation is caoaoie of action only through the efforts of iis officers or 
agems, and Plaintiff Oriob was si:zn an officer and agent for purposes OT the Combined 
Agreement. Thus, by iis terms, the Combined Agreement seeks to bind the Plaintiff 
Oriob as the individual responsible for carrying out the obligations set forth therein on 
behalf of PCG. 
3. All of the obligations of Plaintiff Orlob with respect to the Combined 
Agreement are Inextricably intertwined with his status as President and sole 
shareholder of that closely held corporation, and none of those obligations relate to his 
status solely as an individual unrelated to the corporate entity. 
4. Whatever the nature of Plaintiff Orlob's ownership interest in the 
Combined Agreement, if any, that interest is not severable from the interest of his 
clcsely held corporation, PCG, in the Combined Agreement. 
5. The federal income tax liabilities of PCG arose at a time when Plaintiff 
Orlob was the sole shareholder of PCG and, to whatever extent those liabilities went 
unpaid by PCG, they were the responsibility of Plaintiff Oriob, who failed to pay those 
liabilities. 
6. The seizure of all of PCG's right, title, and interest in the Combined 
Agreement by the Interna! Revenue Service effectively extinguished all obligations due 
under that agreement to either PCG o: to Plaintiff Orlob. Thereafter, Defendant's were 
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required by law to submit all future payments due pursuant to the terms of the 
Combined Agreement :o iha intsrnsi Revenue Service. 
7. The Defendants' purchase from the interna! Revenue Service oi PCG's 
right, title and interest to payments due under the Combined Agreement effectively 
extinguished ai! obligations of the Defenaants to make further payments under the 
Combined Agreement to any person or entity. 
S. The Defendants herein are the sole owners of all monies due pursuant to 
the terms of the Combined Agreement. 
9. As to the Plaintiff's claims in this case, there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, and the Defendants herein are thus entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
DATED this day of May, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
/• /d 
David J. Burns 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
WILLIAM B. BOHLiNG 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID L ORLOB, etal., 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
WASATCH MANAGEMENT, KENNETH 
C. JENSEN, EARLENE B, JENSEN, 




NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 910901061CV 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Plaintiff David L. Orlob, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby gives notice 
of his appeal of the Final Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) entered by the Hon. William 
fe. Bohling, Judge, Third District Court, on November 6, 2000. This appeal is taken to the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
DATED this / ^ r"day of November, 2000. 
PARSONS, DA VIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
/A^J / / ^ 
David J. Burns 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF APPEAL was served by mailing a copy thereof, by first-class United States 
mail, postage prepaid, this / 7 day of November, 2000, to the following: 
James C. Haskins 
Haskins & Associates 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2827 
/ ^ > / / ^ ^ -
David J. Burns 
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